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Denis W. Boivin* Negligence, Strict Liability, and
Manufacturer Failure to Warn:
On Fitting Round Pegs in a
Square Hole
Introduction
In the common law provinces of Canada, it is generally recognized that
a plaintiff in a products liability action in tort must prove four elements
in order to succeed: first, that the product contains a defect traceable either
to its manufacture, to its design, orto its warnings or instructions; second,
that the defendant manufacturer' was somehow negligent in connection
with this defect; third, that there is some causal connection between the
manufacturer's negligence and the damages suffered by the plaintiff; and
fourth, that these damages are such as to give rise to compensation in law.2
In the United States, in the majority of states adhering to a theory of strict
tort liability, the plaintiff in such an action is relieved of the obligation of
proving the second element. However, the plaintiff must still establish the
existence of a defect, recognized damages, and a causal connection
between the two.3
;. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Common Law Section, University of Ottawa. This is
a revised version of a paper written at the Yale Law School in 1992-93 under the supervision
of Professor George L. Priest in partial satisfaction of the author's LL.M. degree. Professor
Priest's concise and always insightful comments are acknowledged and warmly appreciated.
I would also like to thank my research assistant, Dirk K. Mattheus, for his help in editing the
final draft. Of course, any errors or omissions are, like the opinions expressed herein, only
attributable to the author. @ 1993 Denis W. Boivin
1. Unless the context suggests otherwise, references to the term "manufacturer" in this article
should not be interpreted as necessarily excluding other suppliers of products such as
distributors, retailers, liquidators, or service people, from the scope of the principles under
analysis. In recent years, liability in tort for defective products has been imposed on individuals
involved in the supply of products who are not strictly speaking manufacturers. I adopt
"manufacturer" to lighten the text and put aside issues not particularly relevant to my thesis.
2. See generally S.M. Waddams, Products Liability, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1980) and
Ontario Law Commission, Report on Products Liability (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney
General, 1979).
3. See generally M.S. Shapo, The Law ofProducts Liability, 2d ed. (Salem, N.H.: Butterworth
Legal Publishers, 1990) and D.W. Noel & J.J. Phillips, Products Liability, 2d ed. (St. Paul,
Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1982).
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This article focuses on the standard of liability used by courts in these
neighbouring countries, in theory and in practice, when deciding tort
actions predicated on a defect traceable to a product's warnings. Until
recently, warning defects have received relatively little attention outside
of the courtroom in the United States, especially when compared to
manufacturing and design defects.4 In Canada, despite the increasing
reliance by plaintiffs on the failure to warn line of argument, there is a
relative vacuum of accompanying academic commentary.5 In an effort to
break with this trend, this article deals with an issue that has become
increasingly provocative in the last few years: the standard of liability
used to decide failure to warn actions. My goal is to examine the actual
role played by the concept of negligence when deciding whether to hold
manufacturers liable for not warning of risks associated with the use of
their products. Must a manufacturer conduct itself with reasonable care
in all the circumstances in order to escape liability, or must it answer to
some higher standard, irrespective of fault? Theory suggests that both
countries use diametrically opposed approaches on this issue. An analysis
of recent case law reveals otherwise.
4. See M.S. Jacobs, "Toward a Process-Based Approach to Failure-to-Warn Law" (1992), 71
N.C. L. Rev. 121 at 122-23. In footnotes 11- 13 and accompanying text, Professor Jacobs notes
numerous articles and describes how "two decades of almost unbroken scholarly silence" on
this subject slowly began to change. There are a number of recent articles addressing the
problems associated with the standard of liability used to decide failure to warn actions. Other
than those mentioned by Jacobs, see W. Wertheimer, "Unknowable Dangers and the Death of
Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back" (1992), 60 Cin. L. Rev. 1183; R.N.
Pearson, "Strict Liability and Failure to Warn" (1992), 3 Prod. Liab. L.J. 108; Note,
"Reformulating the Strict Liability Failure to Warn" (1992), 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1509;
Note, "The Move Toward a Negligence Standard in Strict Products Liability Failure to Warn
Cases" (1989), 27 Duquesne L. Rev. 755; and A. Gershonowitz, "The Strict Liability Duty to
Warn" (1987), 44 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 71.
5. The growing relevance of failure to warn in the Canadian context is noted by Professor L.N.
Klar in "Recent Developments in Tort Law" (1991), 23 Ottawa L. Rev. 177 at 224-25. To my
knowledge, the only articles published in Canadian legal periodicals focusing primarily on
manufacturers' duty to warn of risks associated with their products are: P. Peppin, "Drug/
Vaccine Risks: Patient Decision-Making and Harm Reduction in the Pharmaceutical Company
Duty to Warn Action" (1991), 70 Can. Bar Rev. 473 and P. Legrand jr., "Pour une thdorie de
l'obligation de renseignement du fabriquant en droit civil canadien" (1981), 26 McGill L.J.
207. Most commentators mention this subject only tangentially to a general discussion of
products liability, which usually revolves around a discussion of the manufacturer's liability
for manufacturing or design defects. Especially when analysing the standard of liability issue
and arguing for the adoption of strict tort liability, Canadian commentators have a tendency of
virtually ignoring failure to warn and of focusing on the judicial treatment of defects traceable
to the manufacture and design of products: see, for example, Ontario Law Reform Commis-
sion, supra, note2 at 17-19; Waddams, supra, note2 at6l-65; andA.M. Linden, Canadian Tort
Law, 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1989) c. 16.
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In Canada, as many commentators have noted, products liability cases
are frequently decided in favour of the plaintiff even though little
evidence of manufacturer negligence is before the court. For example,
Professors Waddams and Linden (as the latter then was) suggest that the
maxim res ipsa loquitur and other evidential devices are often used in
ways that give rise to defacto strict liability, or something akin thereto.
6
It would, they submit, be an incremental step for Canadian courts to
openly adopt strict tort liability. For this and various policy-type reasons,
they urge such a move.7 In particular, they note the general acceptance
and apparent success of this principle in the United States and see no
convincing reason why Canadian courts or legislatures should not adopt
a similar rule.' Likewise, some years ago, the Ontario Law Reform
Commission observed that "there is a large measure of strict liability
already in the law"9 and that a plaintiff who proves defect, injury, and
causation "very rarely fails on the ground that negligence cannot be
established". ° This view greatly influenced the Commission's recom-
mendation that the Ontario Legislature enact a principle of strict tort
liability to serve as the legal basis of liability for damages caused by
defective products." Moreover, the Commission was undoubtedly in-
spired by its perception of the situation in the United States, which it
discussed at length in its report.'2 Despite the alleged tacit acceptance of
6. See, for example, Waddams, supra, note 2 at 61-65; S.M. Waddams, "Strict Products
Liability" in F.E. McArdle, ed., The Cambridge Lectures 1987 (Montr6al: Yvon Blais, 1987)
111 ; Linden, ibid.; C.A. Wright, A.M. Linden, & L.N. Klar, Canadian TortLaiv: Cases, Notes
& Materials, 8th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1985) c. 16 at 74-79; A.M. Linden, "Products
Liability in Canada" in A.M. Linden, ed., Studies in Canadian Tort Law (Toronto: Butterworths,
1968) 216 at 234-47; and A.M. Linden, "A Century of Tort Law in Canada; Wither Unusual
Dangers, Products Liability and Automobile Accident Compensation?" (1967), 45 Can. Bar
Rev. 831 at 857-64. See also J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 7th ed. (Sydney: The Law Book
Company Ltd., 1987) at 469-71; G. Vukelich, "Strict Products Liability 'Just(ice) Out of
Reach'-A Comparative Canadian Survey" (1975), 33 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 46 at 59-62; and E.R.
Alexander, "Recent Developments in the Law of Torts" in Special Lectures of the Law Society
of Upper Canada 1966 (Toronto: Richard De Boo Ltd., 1966) 1 at 46.
7. See, for example, Waddams, supra, note 2 at 258-59 and Linden, supra, note 5 at 563.
8. Professor (now Mr. Justice) Linden, in the works mentioned supra, notes 5 and 6, seems
particularly inspired by the approach adopted in the United States. See also Waddams, supra,
note 2 at 231-54.
9. Supra, note 2 at 33.
10. Ibid. at 17.
11. Ibid. at 135-38.
12. Ibid. at 51-57 and 64.
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some form of strict products liability in Canada and the situation in the
United States, such calls for reform have generally been ignored by
Canadian courts and legislatures.
13
In my view, there are at least two problems peftaining to the current
debate in Canada with respect to products liability. First, those involved
in the debate excessively generalize the necessity and possibility of
applying strict tort liability to all types of defective products, thereby
failing to appreciate the differences between the three generally recog-
13. Canadian courts have been somewhat adamant in their refusal to openly adopt strict tort
liability. A recent example of a missed opportunity to move from a relaxed application of res
ipsa loquiturto an open standard of strictliability for manufacturing defects is Farro v. Nutone
ElectricalLtd. (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 637,68 D.L.R. (4th) 268 (C.A.). It is sometimes noted that
a very high standard of care is imposed on manufacturers of certain products, like those
supplying foods and beverages: see, for example, L.D. Rainaldi, ed., Remedies in Tort, vol. 3
(Toronto: Carswell, 1987) c. 20, at 29-30. Even in such cases, however, the analysis is
portrayed as one of negligence. As for Canadian legislatures, the only pieces of legislation
addressing the standard of liability in tort are New Brunswick's Consumer Product Warranty
and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, s. 27 (adopting strict liability under certain
circumstances) and Quebec's Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Arts. 1468 and 1469
(arguably adopting strict liability).
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nized categories of defects: defects in manufacture, design, and warn-
ing.14 Second, while drawing to a large extent on the experience in the
United States, the proponents of strict liability fail to examine how courts
14. See generally W.P. Keeton, "The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A
Review of Basic Principles" (1980), 45 Missouri L. Rev. 579 at 585-88 and J.J. Philips, "A
Synopsis of the Developing Law of Products Liability" (1978), 28 Drake L. Rev. 317 at 342-
52. The same classification is found in Canadian case law. Generally speaking, a manufactur-
ing defect occurs during the production stage of a product. It is usually the result of an omission
of a component part, of an introduction of a foreign element in the product, or of an omission
or inappropriate execution of some required procedure for the making of a safe product.
Whatever its exact source, the defect occurring during the production stage is usually not
discovered prior to the product entering the market. It is relatively simple fora court to ascertain
whether such a defect is present simply by comparing the product causing the plaintiff's
injuries with other products manufactured according to specifications. A classic example of a
product defective because of a manufacturing defect is Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C.
562,37 Com. Cas. 850 (H.L.) [cited to A.C.] where a consumer is alleged to have found a snail
in an opaque bottle of ginger beer. It is harder, however, to assess the manufacturer's
negligence vis-a-vis this defect and courts often resort to devices such as res ipsa loquitur. A
design defect, on the other hand, occurs during the initial stage of a product's creation, where
it is conceived, sketched, and planned. It is during this stage that manufacturers decide, for
example, which kind of material, components, and safety devices will be incorporated into their
product. A design defect results from a consciously made choice to manufacture a productwith
a certain component or feature and from the eventual discovery-usually following a number
of accidents-that the choice of another component or feature might have resulted in a safer
product. The hallmark distinction between manufacturing and design defects is that an inquiry
into the latter requires the second-guessing of a consciously made choice, whereas an inquiry
into the former involves an assessment of the condition of the injuiy-causing product in
comparison to other products of its kind. Understandably, compared to defects in manufacture,
it is usually more difficult to assess whether a design is defective since choices are in issue as
opposed to results. To this end, courts usually resort to a cost/benefit type of analysis and
consider whether safer alternatives existed at the time of production. An example of a product
defective because of a design defect is the riding lawn mower at issue in Nicholson v. John
Deere Ltd. (1986), 58 O.R. (2d) 53,34 D.L.R. (4th) 542, affirmed (1989) 68 O.R. (2d) 191, 57
D.L.R. (4th) 639 (C.A.) which contained a battery with uncovered terminals in close proximity
to its gas reservoir. Also, the line separating the defect issue from the negligence issue is thinner
with respect to design defects, as commentators in the United States have often noted (see infra
note 16). Lastly, products with defective warnings are those which, although designed and
manufactured with care, are nonetheless defective because they contain no warnings or
inadequate ones with respect to known or knowable dangers associated with the use of the
product. Some have noted, quite correctly, that warning defects are actually a specific instance
of design defects. Nevertheless, both lines of argument raise different issues and courts in
Canada and the United States have treated them as giving a plaintiff two distinct theories of
recovery. As with design defects, the demarcation between the defect inquiry and the
negligence inquiry is not as clear as it is for cases involving manufacturing defect cases.
Moreover, the danger of which manufacturers must warn may either be inherent in the use of
the product, or may result from a manufacturing or design defect discovered after the product's
supply. An example of the former is Lambert v. Lastoplex Chemicals Co., [ 1972] S.C.R. 569,
25 D.L.R. (3d) 121 [hereinafter Lambert v. Lastoplex cited to D.L.R.] where the defendant
failed to warn of the danger of using a highly flammable sealer near a furnace pilot light. An
example of the latter is Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, [ 1974] S.C.R. 1189,40
D.L.R. (3d) 530 [hereinafter Rivtow v. Washington Iron Works cited to D.L.R.] where the
defendants failed to warn of a design defect in the mounting of a crane.
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south of the Canadian border actually decide cases. They forget that the
gap observed in Canadian judgments between theory and practice might
also exist in the United States. In my opinion, such a gap does indeed
exist. True, there are elements of strict liability currently infiltrating
Canadianjudgments even though fault is supposed to be the standard. But
it is also true that elements of negligence increasingly infiltrate the regime
of strict tort liability in the United States. This interplay between negli-
gence and strict liability is particularly noticeable with respect to actions
based on a manufacturer's failure to warn of risks associated with the use
of its product,"5 my subject of analysis, although it also occurs when a
design defect is involved.
16
I contend that many courts in Canada and the United States actually
apply a similar standard of liability when deciding failure to warn actions,
even though their rhetoric may suggest otherwise. This common standard
cannot adequately be described solely in terms of negligence or strict
liability, as it represents a combination of both traditions. A court
deciding a failure to warn action, whether in Canada or the United States,
generally addresses two questions: first, did the manufacturer have a duty
to warn of the risk which materialized and allegedly caused damage to the
plaintiff, and second, if so, was this duty breached in the circumstances
of the case. Although adopting different standards of liability, courts in
both countries approach these questions in a very similar fashion, using
notions of negligence to answer the first question (i.e. the manufacturer's
foreseeability of the risk) while reverting to strict liability to answer the
second (i.e. the adequacy of the product's warning).
This argument is introduced and developed in Parts I and II respec-
tively. In the former, I explain the use made of the two terms most central
15. See, for example, G.T. Schwartz, "Foreword: Understanding Products Liability" (1979),
67 Cal. L. Rev. 435 at 462-63 and G.T. Schwartz, "The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics
of Strict Liability" (1981), 15 Ga. L. Rev. 963 at 972-73. Professor Schwartz is one of the first
to argue that strict liability for design defects and failure to warn is really a form of negligence.
Although there is some truth to such arguments, itis equally misleading to suggest that liability
for failure to warn in the United States is a pure form of negligence. Rather, as in Canada, it
is an amalgam of both strict liability and negligence concepts.
16. Cost-benefit balancing lies at the heart of an inquiry into whether a product design is
defective. Since balancing is also central to the law of negligence, it is often difficult to
distinguish a standard of strict liability with respect to design defects from one of negligence.
See, for example, F.J. Vandali," 'Design Defect' in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence
and Strict Liability" (1982), 43 Ohio St. L.J. 61; B. Lemer, "Strict Products Liability: the
Problem of Improperly Designed Products" (1982), 20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 250; S.L. Bimbaum,
"Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to
Negligence" (1980), 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593; and W.P. Keeton, "Products Liability-Design
Hazards and the Meaning of Defect" (1979), 10 Cumb. L. Rev. 293.
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to my thesis, "negligence" and "strict liability", both generally and in the
specific context of failure to warn actions involving products. In Part II,
the focus shifts to the manner in which these prevailing standards of
liability are actually applied by courts in Canada and the United States.
The objective is not to conduct an exhaustive survey of the law, but to
discern general trends in recent case law. As noted, my principal argu-
ment is that many courts in Canada and the United States use a combina-
tion of both negligence and strict liability concepts when deciding failure
to warn actions involving products. Stated differently, I believe a gap
exists in both countries between the standard of liability adopted in theory
and the one used in practice. References to either of these concepts in
isolation are insufficient to fill this gap. For the most part, Canadian
courts do not treat the manufacturer's negligence in such cases as pivotal.
Nevertheless, their decisions cannot be described solely in terms of strict
liability. Conversely, a growing number of courts in the United States are
distancing themselves from strict liability, but not in order to adopt a pure
negligence theory. In my view, the experience in both countries with
failure to warn actions reveals the emergence of a common compound
standard of liability. In the third and final part, I conduct a brief analysis
and assess the merits of this surfacing standard of liability. Many
commentators have reviewed the appropriateness of general systems of
fault-based and strict liability, as these concepts are currently understood
i.e. with one standard necessarily negating the other. 7 Part m, however,
assesses the appropriateness of a mixed standard of liability, containing
elements of both negligence and strict liability.
17. Recent articles in the United States include: A. Schwartz, "The Case Against Strict
Liability" (1992), 6OFordham L. Rev. 819; R.A. Prentice& M.E. Roszkowski," 'Tort Reform'
and the Liability 'Revolution': Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products"
(1992), 27 Gonz. L. Rev. 251; N.E. Simmonds, "Epstein's Theory of Strict Tort Liability"
(1992), 51 Cambridge L.J. 113; J. Cirace, "A Theory of Negligence and Products Liability"
(1992), 66 St. John's L. Rev. 1; G.L. Priest, "Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability be
Defended?" (1992), 9 Yale J. on Reg. 237; D. Beyleveld, "Impossibility, Irrationality and Strict
Product Liability" (1991), 20 Anglo-American L. Rev. 257; and W.C. Powers, "A Modest
Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability", [1991] U.Ill. L. Rev. 639. In Canada, see, for
example, D. Dewees & M.J. Trebilcock, "The Efficacy of the Tort System and its Alternatives:
A Review of Empirical Evidence" (1992), 30 Osgoode Hail L.J. 57; M.J. Trebilcock,
"Incentive Issues in the Design of 'No-Fault' Compensation Systems" (1989), 39 U. Toronto
L.J. 19; M.J. Trebilcock, "The Future of Tort law: Mapping the Contours of the Debate" (1989),
15 Can. Bus. L.J. 471; S.R. Perry, "The Impossibility of General StrictLiability" (1988), 1 Can.
J. of Jurisprudence 147; Waddams, "Strict Products Liability", supra, note 6; and M.J.
Trebilcock, "Products Liability and the Allergic Consumer: Problems of Framing an Efficient
Liability Regime" (1986), 36 U. Toronto L.J. 52.
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I. The Prevailing Theories of Liability for Failure to Warn:
Negligence and Strict Liability
Negligence and strict liability are concepts difficult to define with
precision. Confusion and divergence of opinion are common in both
academic and judicial circles. The object of this first part is not to
critically review all the material on this matter and to suggest the correct
answers, but to advance sufficient elements to explain the use made of
these concepts in this article. The tone is mostly descriptive; I describe a
relatively uncontroversial core associated with these prevailing standards
of liability and suggest the theoretical foundation required for advancing
to a more tangible case law analysis. Abstract concepts are the focus here,
not the application of these concepts in practical cases. True, there is some
divergence between theory and practice. In fact, this is the thrust of the
article. However, only the theory is addressed in this part.15
Part of the difficulty with defining negligence and strict liability arises
because many scholars and judges use these terms gratuitously, without
articulating their meaning and merely distinguishing them by saying the
one rejects the other. An example is provided by the 1979 Report on
Products Liability published by the Ontario Law Reform Commission.19
As mentioned, the Commission recommended the enactment of a prin-
ciple of strict tort liability to serve as the legal basis of liability for
damages caused by defective products. This recommendation was warmly
embraced by those in the legal community who argued for the adoption
of strict liability in Canada.2" However, there is a noticeable lack of
18. My thesis depends on the meaning given to the concepts of negligence and strict liability.
A very narrow definition of negligence, for example, would likely lead to a conclusion that
courts are doing something else than deciding cases on the basis of the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct. Conversely, a broad definition would lead to the conclusion that courts
uniformly adopt this standard, both in theory and in practice. The same is true with respect to
strict liability. As one of my law professors used to say, it is easy to pull a rabbit out of a hat
when you placed it there in the first place. I am aware of this concern and have chosen to only
identify elements of negligence and strict liability which are relatively uncontroversial, that is,
elements situating themselves at the very core of these theories of liability.
19. Supra, note 2.
20. See, for example, A.M. Linden, "Commentary: OLRC Report on Products Liability"
(1980), 5 Can. Bus. L.J. 92. Professor Waddams contributed to the Commission's study and
his efforts and insights were strongly acknowledged at the beginning of the report.
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elaboration on the exact meaning of such a standard.21 The analysis in the
Report on Products Liability is limited to equating the concept of strict
liability with the removal of negligence as the basis for liability. Strict
liability is defined solely by contrasting it with a regime where the
plaintiff must prove negligence on the part of the manufacturer in order
to succeed.2 In addition, the Commission fails to discuss the standard of
negligence.
A. Negligence-Based Liability
The term "negligence" commonly denotes two concepts in the law of
torts: first, a cause of action comprised of many elements,13 and second,
conduct falling below a certain standard imposed by law. These two
meanings are easily confused. The latter usage is always material in the
context of the former as it constitutes the pivotal element to a cause of
action for negligence. Indeed, once it is shown that the defendant owed
a duty of care to the plaintiff, a breach is established by showing the
defendant acted negligently in the circumstances of the case. However,
the use of negligence to denote conduct falling below a prescribed norm
is neither logically nor legally limited to a cause of action for negligence.
It is sometimes used in other causes of action, comprised of different
21. To be sure, chapter seven of the Report on Products Liability, supra, note 2, discusses at
length the "Scope of Strict Liability". But this chapter deals with aspects of products liability
having no necessary legal or logical connection with strict liability such as damages, monetary
limits on recovery, limitation periods, types of products, classes of plaintiffs, classes of
defendants, defences, contribution, indemnity, jury trials, and class actions. These topics can
be addressed regardless of the standard of liability issue. The omission I attribute to the
Commission concerns the lack of any meaningful discussion on the essence of the legal basis
of liability put forward in their recommendations.
22. Ofcourse, I am not suggesting it is incorrect to Vriew strict liability as liability without proof
of negligence. Such a definition is necessarily accurate. This does not mean, however, that the
sole function of these two concepts is to denote a regime in which proof of unreasonable
behaviour is, or is not, required. Just as it is insufficient to explain negligence by stating what
it is not, or what elements do not have to be established to sustain aclaim, defining strict liability
as liability without negligence, while true, does not tell us the whole story.
23. Courts and commentators have described the elements of the cause of action for
negligence on numerous occasions and in various ways. Briefly, these elements are: a duty of
care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; a breach by the defendant; some injury to the
plaintiff recognized in law; causation between the defendant's breach and the injury; and the
absence of any conduct on the part of the plaintiff prejudicial to his or her recovering in full for
the loss suffered.
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requirements. For example, Canadian courts still recognize a tort of
negligent trespass with the historical shift in the burden of proof.24 In a
trespass action, once the plaintiff establishes that he or she suffered an
injury by force applied directly by the defendant, the burden of proof
shifts to the defendant to demonstrate the absence of intention and
negligence. Similarly, negligence is sometimes used in the context of
criminal law to denote the standard by which to judge the criminality of
the defendant's conduct35
In Canada, suits involving defective products are mostly brought
under negligence theories where the plaintiff must establish all required
elements, including the existence of a duty of care and its breach. 6 Since
Donoghue v. Stevenson,27 few decisions ponder the notion of the duty of
care owed by a manufacturer. Using the speech of Lord Atkin, courts
appear to conclude that a prima facie duty of care exists whenever a
consumer2 suffers damages as the result of a product manufactured by
the defendant, and concentrate instead on other elements of the tort such
as defect, negligence, causation, and damages. Defendants rarely chal-
lenge this presumption, except in cases where the plaintiffs are not
consumers or where the defendants are not manufacturers, in the strict
sense of these words, or where the risks which materialized are arguably
unforeseeable.
For my purposes, it-is important to note that issues of duty of care and
negligence, although closely interrelated, are conceptually distinct. Of
24. See, for example, Cook v. Lewis, [1951] S.C.R. 830, [19521 1 D.L.R. 1; Walmsley v.
Humenick, [1954] 2 D.L.R. 232 (B.C.S.C.); Ellison v. Rogers, [1968] 1 O.R. 501, 67 D.L.R.
(2d) 21 (H.C.); Goshen v. Larin (1975), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 66, 56 D.L.R. (3d) 719 (C.A.); and
Doyle v. Garden of the Gulf Security & Investigations Inc. (1979), 24 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 123,65
A.P.R. 123 (P.E.I.S.C.). See generally R. Sullivan, "Trespass to the Person in Canada: A
Defence of the Traditional Approach" (1988), 19 Ottawa L. Rev. 533.
25. See, for example, Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 79 [reasonable care
in the handling of dangerous substances] and 86 [careless use of a firearm].
26. Numerous actions are also brought-separately or in conjunction with a negligence
claim-under a breach of warranty theory. For an in-depth review of this alternate theory, see
Waddams, supra, note 2. On the similarities between the negligence and breach of warranty
theories, in terms of strict products liability, see W.L. Prosser, "The Assault on the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer)" (1960), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 and S.M. Waddams, "Strict
Liability, Warranties and the Sale of Goods" (1969), 19 U.T.L.J. 157.
27. Supra, note 14.
28. Unless the context suggests otherwise, references to the term "consumer" in this article
should not be interpreted as necessarily excluding other individuals who are injured by
defective products, such as non-paying users and bystanders, from the scope of the principles
under analysis. In recent years, redress in tort for damages caused by defective products has
been extended to individuals involved in the consumption and use of products who are not
strictly spealdng consumers. I adopt "consumer" to lighten the text and put aside issues not
particularly relevant to my thesis.
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course, the former is a question of law mainly for the court to determine
whereas the latter is a question predominantly within the realm of the trier
of fact-in Canada, usually the same body as the trier of law. Beyond this,
both requirements logically and legally involve different inquiries. When
asking whether a defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff, and in
determining the duty's nature and scope, courts concentrate on a number
of factors including: the proximity relationship between the parties; the
foreseeability of the plaintiff and of the risk which materialized; reliance
on the part of the plaintiff vis-ci-vis the defendant's conduct; and the
reasonableness or otherwise of imposing a duty on the defendant.29 On the
other hand, when courts ask whether a defendant has breached said duty
of care (i.e. whether the defendant acted negligently), they focus solely
on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct, comparing it to that of
a reasonable person of ordinary prudence faced with similar circumstances.
When courts are concerned about opening the floodgates of litigation,
about embarking on a slippery slope, or about exposing defendants to
"liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class",30 they often channel their concerns in the direction
of the duty of care issue. There, they can deny the existence of a duty
altogether (as shown by the infamous case of Winterbottom v. Wright3
and its now-obsolete progeny), recognize the possibility of a general duty
29. There is debate in the United Kingdom and Canada about the factors and methods used
to determine the circumstances in which a duty of care is owed to another: see, for example,
Donoghue v. Stevenson, supra, note 14; Hedley Byrne Co. v. Heller & Partners, [1963] 2 All
E.R. 575, [ 1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.); Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [ 1978] A.C. 728,
[197712 All E.R. 492 (H.L.); Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Co., [1982] 3 All E.R. 201, [1983]
A.C. 520 (H.L.); Caparo Industriesplc c. Dickman, [1990] 1 All E.R. 568, [1990] 2 A.C. 605
(H.L.); Murphy v. Brentwood District Council, [1990] 2 All E.R. 908, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 414
(H.L.); Kamloops (City) v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 631; Central Trust Co.
v Rafitse, [ 1986] 2S.C.R. 14,31 D.L.R. (4th)482;B.D.C. Ltd. v.HofstrandFarmns Ltd., [1986]
I S.C.R. 228, [198613 W.W.R. 216; Rothfieldv. Manolakos, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1259; Canadian
National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 1021, 11 C.C.L.T. (2d)
1; and London Drugs v. Brassart and Vanwinkel, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 299, 97 D.L.R. (4th) 261.
30. Ultramares Corp. v. Touch, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 at 444 per Cardozo J. (1931).
31. (1842), 152 E.R. 402,11 LJ. 415. This casewas interpreted as standing fortheproposition
that conduct of A constituting a breach of a contractual obligation to B could not concurrently
give C, a third party, a cause of action in tort. From this, developed the now-rejected rule that
manufacturers of products owed a duty of care only to those with whom they shared privity of
contract. See, for example, F. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, 1926) at 76-80; Fleming, supra, note 6 at 465-66; Wright, Linden & Klar,
supra, note 6, c. 16 at 10; and Huset v. J.L Case Threshing Co., 120 F.865 (8th Cir. 1903).
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of care as in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.32 and Donoghue v.
Stevenson,33 but deny its existence in the particular facts before it, or
recognize a duty but limit its nature and scope. The concept of negligence,
on the other hand, is immune from such considerations, at least in theory.
It is more concerned with the case before the court than with other
potential actions, and its focus is the conduct of the specific defendant at
bar. No doubt, a trier is aware that a judgment of negligence will affect
future decisions involving similar conduct. Hence, even the question of
whether the standard of liability has been met may be affected by
considerations going beyond the specific facts of a case. Overall, how-
ever, there is a conceptual difference between the duty of care and
negligence requirements, both with respect to the predominant focus of
the inquiries and the factors considered in making these determinations.
The importance of distinguishing the duty of care issue from the
negligence standard of liability is highlighted by the action for failure to
warn. As will be shown in Part II, courts in Canada and in a majority of
the United States require the manufacturer's knowledge-actual or
constructive-of the danger which materialized before finding that a duty
to warn with respect to said danger was owed. In principle, this inquiry
is no different from the one adopted in most negligence causes of action.
That is, it concentrates less on the conduct of a particular manufacturer
than on broader considerations such as proximity, foreseeability, reli-
ance, and reasonability. Unlike the typical cause of action for negligence,
however, these courts do not endorse a fault based standard of liability
during the second inquiry to determine whether said duty was breached.
In a typical negligence case, this question is determined by focusing on
the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. Yet, when a duty to warn
is triggered, courts ignore to a large extent the conduct of the manufac-
turer in considering the breach issue. Rather, they focus on factors
common to other strict products liability actions such as the condition of
32. 217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916) [hereinafter MacPherson v. Buick]. This decision is
most famous in the United States for its rejection of the privity requirement derived from
Winterbottom v. Wright, ibid., and its adoption of a general rule, engulfing a patchwork of
earlier exceptions, allowing consumers to sue manufacturers directly for breach of a duty of
care, irrespective of contract.
33. Supra, note 14. In essence, this decision played the same role in Canada as MacPherson
v. Buick, ibid., did in the United States. In addition, the speech of Lord Atkin is famous
generally for the "neighbour" principle concerning the existence of a duty of care (at 580-81)
and its specific articulation in the field of products liability (at 599).
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the product.34 To state the matter somewhat differently, courts in both
countries determine first whether a duty to warn was owed by using, inter
alia, a foreseeability factor (i.e. by using a factor commonly used in a
negligence cause of action with respect to the duty of care element), but
then depart from the usual negligence inquiry by focusing almost exclu-
sively on the nature of the product and largely ignoring the conduct of the
manufacturer (i.e. by adopting a standard of liability which is not
concerned with the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct).
If a failure to warn action were decided on the basis of a negligence
standard of liability, one would expect a typical case to ask, inter alia,"5
two fundamental questions: (1) whether or not the manufacturer owed a
duty to warn the plaintiff with respect to the risk which materialized and
caused harm to said plaintiff and (2) if the first answer is affirmative,
whether the manufacturer acted negligently in all the circumstances
thereby breaching its duty. As in a typical negligence case, the first
inquiry would consider the proximity of relation between the parties, the
manufacturer's foreseeability of the danger, any reliance coming from
the plaintiff, and the reasonableness or otherwise of imposing a duty on
the manufacturer. These factors would determine not only whether a duty
to warn was owed to the plaintiff, but its nature and scope. If the analysis
leads to the conclusion that no duty was owed to the plaintiff, the inquiry
is over and the manufacturer is not liable. There would be no need to
address the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct, the defective
nature of the product, the damage caused to the plaintiff, or the causation
between the defect and damage.
If, however, the answer to the first question is "yes", the trier must ask
whether this duty was breached and the focus then becomes the conduct
of the defendant manufacturer. Part of the answer requires determining
34. Many courts and commentators in the United States use these elements to distinguish a
fault based test of liability from strict products liability. It is said that the focus in the latter case
is not the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct but the condition of the product
supplied. See, for example, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal.3d413,573 P.2d443 at447
(1979) [cited to P.2d]; Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 at 812 (9th Cir.
1974); Keeton, supra, note 16 at 315; Wade, "On Product 'Design Defects' and Their
Actionability" (1980) 33 Vand. L. Rev. 551 at 553; and Weinstein et al., "Product Liability:
An Interaction of Law and Technology" (1974), 12 Duquesne L. Rev. 425 at 429. Although
this distinction has come under recent attack by some academics, notably in J.A. Henderson
& A.D. Twerski, "Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to
Warn" (1990), 65 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 265, it continues to receive the endorsement of many courts
including the Supreme Court of California inAnderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 53
Cal.3d 987, 810 P.2d 549 (1991) [hereinafter Anderson v. Owens-Coming cited to P.2d].
35. As noted in the introduction, regardless of the standard of liability adopted, it is clear that
a plaintiff must establish the existence of a defect in the product, some damage resulting from
said defect, and a causal connection between the defect and the damage suffered.
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whether the manufacturer gave a warning and, if so, whether it was
adequate in all the circumstances. But this only addresses the defective
nature of the product and tells us nothing about the behaviour of the
manufacturer. Under a negligence theory, one should not only ask
whether the manufacturer's behaviour was negligent; one should actually
answer this question. It would not be sufficient under this second inquiry
to focus solely on the condition of the product and to answer that it was
defective. As noted, although the existence of a defect is indeed crucial
in a negligence cause of action, it is not the chief concern at this stage of
the inquiry. Rather, a trier ought to concentrate on the actions of the
manufacturer in putting a product on the market with a warning of the sort
in question. Thus, one expects the balancing of a number of factors such
as the costs of avoiding the accident, the costs of harm, and the likelihood
that the risk will materialize, in order to determine whether the manufac-
turer created, by its conduct, an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
B. Strict Liability
As previously noted, few courts and commentators attribute to the
concept of strict liability a meaning beyond that of implying a rejection
of a fault based standard of liability.36 The example previously given
about the Report on Products Liability remains apposite. Most under-
stand the proposition that a defendant is held strictly liable for harm
caused as simply meaning that the defendant is responsible regardless of
any care-or lack thereof-exercised in avoiding said harm. In other
words, the common definition is purely negative: it tells us that strict
liability is not concerned with fault when deciding whether the defendant
is responsible; but adds little to indicate what it is concerned with. This
is true not only when the concept is used with respect to defective
products, but also when used to describe the judicial treatment of hazards
such as dangerous animals, dangerous substances brought onto one's
land, and ultrahazardous activities, as well as when dealing with liability
of sellers for breach of implied warranties. When those involved in the
products liability debate turn to these latter examples for reassurance that
strict liability in torts is not a new development-or, conversely, that
negligence is not as fundamental and established as some might be-
lieve-they only refer to the rejection of fault implicit in those realms of
decision-making.
36. For an effort to advance some substantive content to the concept of strict liability, see G.
Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven, CN: Yale
University press, 1970) and G. Calabresi & J.T. Hirschoff, "Toward a Test for Strict Liability
in Torts" (1972), 81 Yale L.J. 1055.
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In this sense, strict liability has the appearance of being a versatile
concept, capable of describing liability for, inter alia, defective products
(in contract and in tort), dangerous animals, dangerous substances, and
ultrahazardous activities, without requiring specific adaptations as when
a negligence standard is used. Indeed, while it is also possible to describe
superficially the standard of liability governing medical malpractice,
professional responsibility, and automobile accidents with the universal
"reasonable care in all the circumstances" principle, one needs little
imagination to understand that important differences exist in the way this
standard is applied in each context. The reason for this is simple: the
negligence standard has a positive meaning, telling us what is considered
relevant for deciding against the defendant-fault. This, naturally, varies
with the circumstances. Strict liability, on the other hand, tells us nothing
in its common usage about what it considers relevant for making a
decision, other than that negligence is not relevant. Nevertheless, the
concept of strict liability tailors itself to each specific area in which it is
used. A decision to adopt the strict liability standard is not merely a
decision to reject an inquiry into fault. It is a conscious decision to change
both the questions asked and the focus of the inquiry.
It is generally recognized, in matters of products liability, that a
standard of strict liability eliminates the requirement of fault on the part
of the manufacturer. The reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct
becomes immaterial and the focus is exclusively on the defective nature
of the product. Unlike negligence liability, which emphasizes the conduct
of the manufacturer, strict liability is concerned solely with whether the
product allegedly causing damage to the plaintiff was in a defective
condition at the time of the accident.17 As when negligence is the norm,
the inquiry into the defectiveness of a product usually takes one of three
forms: (1) an inquiry into the manufacturing of the product; (2) an inquiry
into the design of the product; and/or (3) an inquiry into the warnings
accompanying the product. It is relatively easy to determine whether a
product contains a manufacturing defect, simply by comparing the
product causing the plaintiffs injuries with a similar product manufac-
tured according to specifications .3 But when it comes to design defects
and especially defects in warnings, it is harder to make this determination
as courts are faced with choices, and not simply results.39
37. Supra, note 34 and accompanying text.
38. Supra, note 14.
39. Ibid.
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In the United States, the vast majority of states have adopted, either
judicially or legislatively, a principle of strict products liability in tort
modeled on § 402A of the Restatement (Second) in Torts." Under this
section, someone who sells a product "in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer" will be liable for physical and
property damages thereby caused.4 This rule is said to apply "although
the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale" of its
product.42 This gives the rule its distinctive strict liability flavour. It
directs a court to focus not on the conduct of the manufacturer and
whether it was reasonable in all the circumstances, but on the defective
nature of the product. Section 402A does add a modifier to this analysis,
however, with the statement that the defective product must be "unrea-
sonably dangerous". Obviously, this is not directed to the reasonableness
of the manufacturer's conduct as there would be serious inconsistencies
within the rule. Rather, it means that the product sold "must be dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics"." This consumer expectations quali-
fication, if desired, could easily be incorporated into the very definition
of what is a "defect", instead of being attached as a separate element.
Indeed, some state courts and legislatures have rejected this modifier only
to re-channel the consumer expectations component into the definition of
defect itself.4
Any discussion of strict liability would not be complete without some
reference to the policy considerations giving rise to this alternative form
40. W.L. Prosser, "The Fall ofthe Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)" (1966),50 Minn.
L. Rev. 791 at 793-98 describes the rapid pace at which states recognized strict liability
following the publication in 1965 of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. By 1966,
it had been adopted by legislation orjudicial decision in 24 states. For the current situation, see
"State Chart-Acceptance of Strict Liability", I Products Liability Reporter (C.C.H.) T 4016
(November 1988-April 1989), summarizing recognition of strict products liability in all the
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico as follows: (1) 37 states and the District of
Columbia adopt the Restatement's version of strict tort liability; (2) 8 states and Puerto Rico
recognize variations of § 402A; (3) Delaware, Massachussetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and
Virginia have not yet adopted strict tort liability; and (4) in all, the "unreasonably dangerous"
condition in § 402A has been rejected by 9 states, including California and New York, and
Puerto Rico.
41. This applies, provided the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
itis expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition
in which it was sold: Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(l)(a) & (b) (1965).
42. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(2)(a) (1965). Moreover, subsection 2(b) provides
that the rule applies regardless of privity of contract.
43. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), Comment i.
44. See, for example, Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra, note 34. On this point, see also
"State Chart-Acceptance of Strict Liability", supra, note 40.
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of liability. The principal rationales are found in the concurring reasons
of Mr. Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.45 and in his
opinion for the Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc. ,46 two
landmark decisions in this area which incorporate by reference the works
of numerous commentators such as Prosser and Calabresi. These ration-
ales include: the manufacturer is in the best position to avoid the risks of
injury by taking preventive measures; the loss may be overwhelming for
the plaintiff, but the manufacturer can procure insurance and distribute
the loss to society as a cost of doing business; regardless of negligence,
the manufacturer is responsible for products placed on the market and
should bear the loss; it is often difficult for the injured person to establish
negligence; the trier of fact often applies, in effect, strict liability via the
use of evidential shortcuts such as res ipsa loquitur; many statutes already
endorse a strict liability rule in the case of food products; the current
principle allowing the plaintiff to sue the retailer for breach of warranty
(i.e. in strict liability47) but not the manufacturer-who can nevertheless
be sued for breach of warranty by the seller-is needlessly circuitous and
engenders wasteful litigation; in food products cases, many courts have
created exceptions to the privity of contract rule and have extended the
warranty from the manufacturer to the consumer, thus allowing the latter
to sue the former directly for breach of warranty (i.e. in strict liability);
sales warranties serve the purposes of deterrence and compensation
"fitfully atbest"; and, there is greater reliance today as consumers lack the
means and skills to fully investigate every product and their vigilance is
lulled by advertising and market devices .4S Recently, it has been observed
that these rationales only go so far, and that strict liability "was never
intended to make the manufacturer or distributor of a product its in-
surer". 9 Concerns about fairness to the defendant manufacturer have also
been raised to counterbalance these policy goals.50
45. 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) [hereinafter Escola cited to P.2d].
46. 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) [hereinafter Greenmian cited to P.2d].
47. See Prosser and Waddams, supra, note 26.
48. For more on the justifications for strict liability in tort, see generally Prosser, ibid. See also
Wertheimer, supra, note 4 at 1184-91 (insuring adequate compensation and fairness for those
injured by defective products) and Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents, supra, note 41 and G.
Calabresi, "Optimal Deterrence and Accidents" (1975), 84 Yale L.J. 656 (placing the burden
for defective products on the party who is in the best position to insure itself against the loss,
to take preventive measures and to spread the loss amongst all those who benefit from products
in society).
49. Anderson v. Owens-Corning, supra, note 34 at 552.
50. See, for example, J.A. Henderson & A.D. Twerski, "A ProposedRevision of Section402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts" (1992), 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512.
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In a failure to warn action, the adoption of a strict liability theory
should mean that the conduct, knowledge, and actions of the defendant
manufacturer in putting its product on the market ought to be immaterial.
The focus of the inquiry should be solely on the defective nature of the
product. Factors such as foreseeability of the risk, used at the stage of
determining whether a duty to warn arises, would be irrelevant. Similarly,
the reasonable care exercised by the manufacturer would not be consid-
ered with respect to the breach issue. It is often said that the goal of
providing warnings on products is twofold: first, reducing the risk of
accidents, and second, offering sufficient information to consumers to
allow them to make informed decisions as to whether to use a product.
5 1
With respect to defects traceable to a product's warnings, one would
expect the analysis to be centred exclusively on the defective nature of the
product in relation to these underlying goals. That is, once it is clear that
the risk in question was non-obvious, 52 the question would be whether the
product contained a warning sufficient to transmit to consumers the
nature of the danger involved, the ways to prevent or avoid a materializa-
tion of the risk, and the emergency measures to take in case of an accident,
thereby reducing the risk of accidents and enabling consumers to make
informed decisions. If the warning is "adequate" in all the circumstances,
the manufacturer would not be liable for failing to warn even if signs of
negligence are otherwise present. Conversely, if the warning is "inad-
equate", the manufacturer would be liable for losses caused by this defect
even if it exercised all reasonable care in the circumstances to warn
consumers of risks associated with its product. 3
II. The Prevailing Standards of Liability as Applied in Practice
A. The Situation in Canada
As noted, negligence is the standard of tort liability adopted by Canadian
courts when dealing with defective products. When the alleged defect is
based upon a manufacturer's failure to warn, this standard implies that
two questions will be addressed in judging a manufacturer's responsibil-
ity: first, whether the manufacturer owed a duty to warn the plaintiff of
the risk which materialized and allegedly caused harm to the plaintiff, and
51. See, for example, Henderson & Twerski, supra, note 34 at 285-86 and Note, "Reformu-
lating the Strict Liability Failure to Warn", supra, note 4.
52. I say "non-obvious" because neither the risk-reduction nor the informed-decision objec-
tives are promoted by requiring a manufacturer to warn against obvious dangers, such as the
sharpness of a knife.
53. See generally Gershonowitz, supra, note 4 and M.S. Madden, 'The Duty to Warn in
Products Liability: Contours and Criticism" (1987), 89 W.Va. L. Rev. 221.
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second, if so, whether the manufacturer breached this duty in the
circumstances of the case.54 In an attempt to scrutinize the rhetoric of
negligence, I shall examine how each of these inquiries are conducted in
practice.
55
Among the factors traditionally considered when determining whether
a duty of care arises in a particular situation, one receives particular
attention when a duty to warn.is at issue: foreseeability of the risk. In
every Canadian decision involving a manufacturer's alleged failure to
warn of a danger associated with its product, whether or not said risk is
inherent in the use of the product or the result of a defect in manufacture
or design, there is mention of the manufacturer's knowledge (or lack
thereof) of the danger posed by its product. Excluding cases where the
plaintiff is not a consumer and those where the defendant is not a
manufacturer, in the strictest sense of these terms, there is little discussion
about the proximity of relationship between the parties, the reliance
placed on the defendant, or the reasonableness or otherwise of imposing
a duty to warn on the manufacturer. After Donoghue v. Stevenson and its
progeny, these elements are largely taken for granted. If the defect is
traceable to the manufacturer's failure to warn, the first inquiry usually
concentrates entirely on foreseeability of the risk which materialized and
caused damage to the plaintiff.
Originally, courts focused on the manufacturer's actual knowledge of
the risk. An example is the 1971 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
in Lambert v. Lastoplex.56 This case involved the manufacturer of a fast
drying lacquer sealer called Supremo W-200. The product was known by
the manufacturer to be highly inflammable and its container bore three
separate cautions to this effect, notably warning against using the product
54. Again, there are other issues-not directly considered herein-which must be addressed
before finding the manufacturer liable, such as the causal connection between a failure to warn
and the damages suffered by the plaintiff, the assessment of these damages, and conduct on the
part of the plaintiff which may evidence an assumption of risk or contributory negligence.
55. The relevance of the first question will become apparent when considering the situation
in the United States and during the analysis in Part II. At this stage, one may doubt that
Canadian courts actually depart from fault-based liability when inquiring whether or not a
manufacturer owed a duty to warn of a particular risk. The short answer is that, indeed, they
do not greatly differ during this inquiry from a theory of negligence. Rather, it is during the
second inquiry that courts commonly leave the principles of negligence behind. Examples of
the manner in which the standard of liability differs in practice from theory will therefore
appear mostly when the second question is addressed.
56. Supra, note 14. See also Stewart v. Lepage's Inc., [1955] O.R. 937 (H.C.) (manufacturer
knew at least five years before an accident that its glue had propensity to blow caps off
containers) and Schmitz v. Stoveld (1974), 11 O.R. (2d) 17, 64 D.L.R. (3d) 615 (Co. Ct.)
(manufacturer of floor sealer and varnish knew of the risk of fire and explosion associated with
its product).
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near open flames. The plaintiff planned to use the product to seal the floor
of a recreation room located in the basement of his house. A furnace and
water heater equipped with pilot lights were located in the basement in an
adjoining room. Although the plaintiff turned down the thermostat of the
furnace and took other precautionary measures, he did not extinguish the
pilot lights. He began to apply the sealer and approximately one hour
later, the fumes from the product came into contact with one or both of
the pilot lights causing a fire and leading to an explosion which injured
the plaintiff and caused property damage. The plaintiff sued in negligence
arguing, inter alia, that the manufacturer had failed to give an adequate
warning about the volatility and inflammability of its product.
Mr. Justice Laskin, writing for a unanimous court, began his analysis
of the duty to warn by emphasizing that the hazard of fire attributable to
Supremo W-200 was clearly known to the manufacturer. From this,
Laskin J. noted there was "hence no need here to consider whether any
other basis of liability would bejustified if the manufacturer was unaware
or could not reasonably be expected to know (if that be conceivable) of
particular dangers which its product in fact had for the public at large or
for a particular class of users". 57 Arguably, he was alluding to strict
liability in this excerpt. In this respect, he was juxtaposing negligence-
with the foreseeability factor central to a duty to warn-with strict
liability, and dismissing the possibility that "another basis of liability"
might be available and preferable even when the manufacturer is aware
of the risk involved. Implicit in Laskin J.'s comment are assumptions
commonly held thatforeseeability of the risk is relevant solely in an
action based on negligence and that it is unnecessary to look for an
alternative basis of liability when such an element is present.
In my view, suppositions like these are largely responsible for the
continuing myth that Canadian courts apply a pure theory of negligence
in failure to warn cases. Many courts appear to think that in order to
sustain a finding of negligence it is sufficient to find that the manufacturer
knew, or should have known, of the risk, regardless of the defendant's
otherwise reasonable behaviour. I am not suggesting that these courts are
wrongly applying the concept of foreseeability. Rather, I submit that
contrary to common assumption, a finding that the manufacturer knew or
should have known of a danger does not (nor should it) preclude a
standard of liability other than negligence from being applied in deciding
whether a manufacturer ought to bear the loss for damages caused by its
products, and that another standard is indeed applied.
57. Lambert v. Lastoplex, supra, note 14 at 124.
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Laskin J. then described the nature of the duty owed by manufacturers
with respect to their products. He distinguished the duty to manufacture
products safely from the duty to warn by noting that respecting the former
does not necessarily discharge the latter. If a product put on the market for
ultimate purchase and use by the general public is properly manufactured
but nonetheless dangerous to use, and the manufacturer is aware of its
dangerous character, it cannot "without more, pass the risk of injury to the
consumer".5 8 In such a situation, a duty to warn is triggered: the manufac-
turer "knowing of their hazardous nature, has a duty to specify the
attendant dangers". 9 The scope of the duty to warn is said to vary with the
circumstances of the case, requiring a degree of explicitness appropriate
to the danger likely to be encountered in the ordinary use of the product.
I will return to the question of whether the manufacturer of Supremo W-
200 breached this duty. For now, it is sufficient to note the crucial role
played by the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger in determining
whether a duty to warn arose.
Despite the language chosen by Laskin J., courts did not hesitate to
extend the duty to warn to situations where, although there was little
evidence supporting a finding of actual knowledge, the circumstances
justified an inference that the manufacturer knew of the risk associated
with its product or "should have known" about it. For example, in
Meilleur v. U.N.L-Crete Can. Ltd.,6°an employee using a liquid concrete
additive ("Uni-Crete XL") to seal the interior of a tunnel under construc-
tion became permanently blind when accidentally sprayed in the face
with the substance. The employee was not wearing protective eye-wear
at the time of the accident. The labels on the drums of Uni-Crete XL
warned generally of its irritant propensities, but not of possible blindness.
The manufacturer and distributor were sued in negligence and they
replied, inter alia, that they did not know that their product could cause
blindness. Mr. Justice Steele disregarded this argument, stating that the
real question was whether the risk of blindness was so foreseeable that
they should have known of the danger. Relying on trade standards
concerning corrosive products such as Uni-Crete XL, and the fact that the
defendants knew that their product was highly corrosive, Steele J. found
that the defendants should have been aware of the dangerous nature of
their product and should have given better warnings.
58. Ibid. at 125.
59. Ibid.
60. (1985), 32 C.C.L.T. 126, 15 C.L.R. 191 (Ont. H.C.)[hereinafterMeilleurv. U.N.I.-Crete
cited to C.C.L.T.].
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A similar analysis is found in Smithson and Smithson v. Saskem
Chemicals Ltd.61 In this case, one of the plaintiffs used a chemical drain
cleaner ("Drainex") to unblock a floor drain in the dry cleaning plant
owned and operated by herself and her husband. Four days later, the
problem was persisting and she applied a second chemical ("Gillette's
lye") manufactured by another company. A violent reaction occurred
during the second application. The plaintiff was splattered with the
chemical substance, suffered severe bums, and became permanently
blind. She and her husband sued the manufacturers and retailers of both
products. Both products were labelled as appropriate for cleaning drains
and were marked corrosive in conformity with federal requirements. The
labels also indicated that the products contained sulphuric acid (Drainex)
land sodium hydroxide (lye) respectively, but did not specify the percent-
age of these chemicals. Drainex cautioned to "not use where other drain
chemicals are present", whereas the second product was silent on this
issue. In defence, the manufacturer of lye argued that it did not owe a duty
to warn because it was unaware that its product could contribute to such
a violent reaction when mixed with sulphuric acid. Noble J. rejected this
argument because of the following: there are many decisions in the
United States where a similar product did cause these damages; both
manufacturers should know that all drain cleaners contain some form of
acid or sodium hydroxide; and, both manufacturers should have realised
that the mixing of these products created a "very real and in that sense a
foreseeable risk". 62 In other words, regardless of the manufacturer's
actual knowledge, the circumstances indicated that it should have been
aware of the risk.
61. (1985), 43 Sask. R. 1, [1986] 1 W.W.R. 145 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Smithson v. Saskem
Chemicals cited to W.W.R.].
62. Ibid. at 153-54.
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Buchan v. Ortho Pharmaceutical (Canada) Ltd.,63 Rothwell v. Raes
and Connaught Laboratories,6 and many other decisions65 may also be
cited for the proposition that a manufacturer has a duty to warn of risks
not only known, but reasonably knowable. The decisions mentioned thus
far deal with risks inherent in the use of certain products-the volatility
and inflammability of a sealer, the danger to eyesight of a concrete
additive, the danger of mixing drain cleaners, the serious side effects of
certain pharmaceutical products, and so on. In these cases, the product
was manufactured according to specifications and arguments about
design defects were either rejected or ignored. The only claim in tort
sustained was that the manufacturer failed to warn of a risk inherent to the
use of the product.
Other decisions apply the manufacturer's duty to warn to risks which
are, in some respects, "external" to the product and result instead from a
defect in its manufacture or design. These decisions are particularly
noticeable because courts continue to focus on the manufacturer's actual
knowledge of the risk and seem reluctant to adopt a reasonably knowable
standard. A telling example is the 1973 Supreme Court of Canada
decision in Rivtow v. Washington Iron Works,66 where the Court held that
the manufacturer and the supplier of cranes were under a duty to warn
those to whom the cranes had been supplied of a defect in design of which
they became aware and which made the cranes dangerous for their
intended purpose.
63. (1986),52 O.R. (2d) 92,25 D.L.R. (4th) 658 at 666 [hereinafter Buchan v. Ortho cited to
D.L.R.].
64. (1988), 66 O.R. (2d) 449, 54 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at 336 (H.C.) [hereinafter Rothivell v. Raes
cited to D.L.R.].
65. See, for example, Labrecque v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1980] 3 W.W.R. 558, 110
D.L.R. (3d) 686 at 691 (Sask. C.A.) reversing in part, [1977] 6 W.W.R. 122,78 D.L.R. (3d)
289 (Q.B.) [cited to D.L.R.] (a manufacturer of herbicide "ought to have known" the
characteristics of the product which made it suitable for use on flax crops only under certain
specific conditions); Coninco Ltd. v. Westinghouse Can. Ltd. (1981), 45 B.C.L.R. 26, 127
D.L.R. (3d) 544 reversed on other grounds (1983), 45 B.C.L.R. 35, 147 D.L.R. (3d) 279
[hereinafter Cominco v. Westinghouse cited to D.L.R.] (evidence sufficient to support a
conclusion that the defendant knew or ought to have known of a cable's propensity to catch
fire); Pirie v. Merck Frosst Canada Inc. (1989), 243 A.P.R. 337, 96 N.B.R. (2d) 337 (Q.B.)
[hereinafter Pirie v. Merck Frosst cited to A.P.R.] (the expert evidence supports an inference
that a manufacturer of herbicide used for potatoes knew that increased loss of potatoes from
bacterial soft rot was an inherent risk associated with the use of the product on potatoes that
were coming wet from the field, after a wet season, to be placed in storage without forced
ventilation); and Chase v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1991), 291 A.P.R. 181, 115 N.B.R.
(2d) 181 (Q.B.) [hereinafter Chase v. Goodyear cited to A.P.R.] (because of a number of
complaints made each year, a manufacturer of tires "should have anticipated" that the radial
cords of its tires may have gradually weakened through over-deflection while the tire has been
in use, that the sidewalls may explode while being inflated, and that anybody inflating the tire
should use the "clip-on" air valve and stand well away when the tire is being inflated).
66. Supra, note 14.
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The plaintiff in Rivtow v. Washington Iron Works used special cranes
in its logging business. The cranes were designed and manufactured by
one defendant and supplied by the other. To both defendants' knowledge,
a defective design made the continuous use of the cranes dangerous-
cracks in the mountings would develop under operation leading to
potential collapse. Extensive repairs and alterations were required to
render the cranes safe for their intended purpose. Despite having actual
knowledge of the defect and of the use the plaintiff intended to make of
the cranes, neither of the defendants took any steps to warn of the potential
danger and necessity for repairs. Indeed, the plaintiff was first made
aware of the seriousness of the situation during the busiest season of the
year when, following a fatal accident involving another crane designed
and manufactured by the same manufacturer, the plaintiff took the
precaution of inspecting its cranes for structural defects. During inspec-
tion, it discovered what the defendants knew of the defect many months
earlier. The plaintiff sued the manufacturer and supplier for the costs of
repairing the cranes and for the loss of profits suffered while the cranes
were idle.
The decision of the Supreme Court is mostly noted for its discussion
of the plaintiff's attempt to recover in tort for purely economic losses.67
The aspect on which I concentrate here is the Court's treatment of the duty
to warn. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Ritchie J. observed on several
occasions that the plaintiff's suit was based on a failure to warn and not
on a negligent manufacture and design of the product supplied. Accord-
ing to Ritchie J., "[t]he difference between the two types of liability and
consequent damage is that one may arise without the manufacturer
having any knowledge of the defect, whereas the other stems from his
awareness of the danger to which the defect gives rise.'' 6s In other words,
the defendant's actual knowledge of the risk is not only an aggravating
circumstance in determining the existence of a duty to warn, it is a sine
qua non.69 The reasons of Ritchie J. are replete with references to the
defendants' actual knowledge of the risk posed by the defective cranes,
67. On this aspect, a more recent discussion may be found in Canadian National Railway Co.
v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., supra, note 29.
68. Supra, note 14 at 542 [emphasis added].
69. Ritchie J. characterized the basis of liability in this way in order to deal with the problem
of recovery for purely economic loss presented by the plaintiff's claim. Apparently, it was
acceptable to the majority to allow a claim for economic loss in circumstances where a
manufacturer could have prevented the losses at very little cost had it disclosed the information
to which it was privy. However, the majority seemed uneasy about allowing such recovery
where only a defect in manufacture or design was present and this on the assumption that such
defects do not necessarily carry with them the defendant's knowledge of the risk involved.
On Fitting Round Pegs in a Square Hole
of the person who would be using the cranes, and of the purpose for which
this person would use the cranes. 70 This knowledge carried with it a duty
to warn those to whom the cranes had been supplied of the danger, a duty
which "arose at the moment when the [defendants] or either of them
became seized with the knowledge".71 Even if the defect was discovered
after the product's supply, the defendants had a duty to warn those to
whom the product had already been supplied.
72
Another illustration is offered by the decision of the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal in Setrakov Construction Ltd. v. Winder's Storage &
Distributors Ltd.73 There, the owner of a 1969 Caterpillar tractor hired a
common carrier to move the tractor a short distance. The carrier loaded
the tractor onto a trailer purchased as a used unit from its manufacturer,
the Fruehauf Trailer Company of Canada. Apparently because of the
trailer's defective suspension, the tractor was thrown off and damaged
shortly after beginning its voyage. The owner of the tractor recovered in
full from the common carrier since the latter was legislatively subject to
absolute liability. The Court held, however, that the carrier could recover
against the manufacturer of the trailer in tort for the amount of damages
awarded to the owner. The manufacturer had been informed by the
manufacturer of the trailer's suspension of a design defect and of the need
for remedial measures. The former nonetheless supplied the trailer to the
carrier without warning. Relying on Rivtow v. Washington Iron Works,
Hall J.A. held that the manufacturer of the trailer "had the duty either to
make the trailer safe before it was sold or to warn [the carrier]. It's failure
to do either was the cause of the accident and it is liable."74 Again, the
manufacturer knew of the risk and of the person who would suffer should
such a risk materialize.
70. In this respect, the emphasis was placed not only on the defendants' foreseeability of the
risk, but also on their foreseeability of the ultimate plaintiff.
71. Supra, note 14 at 536.
72. On the post-supply duty to warn, see also Cominco v. Westinghouse, supra, note 65;
Nicholson v. John Deere Ltd., supra, note 14 (manufacturer ofa lawn mowerhas a duty to warn
users upon becoming aware of a design defect creating an unreasonable risk of fire); and N.S.
(Ministr' of Government Senices) v. Picker Canada Ltd. (1989), 92 N.S.R. (2d) 385, 237
A.P.R. 385 (T.D.) (manufacturer of a component part used in an X-ray machine has a duty to
warn the manufacturer of the ultimate product about a defect in the component part after
becoming aware of it, even though the component has already been incorporated into the
product).
73. (1981), 11 Sask. R. 286, 128 D.L.R. (3d) 301 (C.A.) [hereinafter Setrakov v. Winder's
cited to D.L.R.]. No mention is made of Saskatchewan's Consumer Products Warranties Act,
R.S.S. 1978, c. C-30. The part ofthis decision relevant to this article addresses the manufacturer's
liability in tort.
74. Ibid. at 304.
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McCain Foods Ltd. v. Grand Falls Industries Ltd.75 provides a recent
example of failure to warn in conjunction with manufacture and design
defects. In late 1986, the plaintiff hired a crane mounted on a truck and
an operator to lift a heavy juice packaging machine and load it on a trailer
for delivery. The lessor of the crane (Grand Falls) had purchased it second
hand in 1980, when it was already twelve years old. The life expectancy
of the crane was twenty years. Due to a defect in the mounting of the crane
which occurred during manufacturing in 1967-68, the crane collapsed
during the procedure causing substantial damage to the juice packaging
machine. The manufacturer had issued service bulletins in 1977 and 1981
with respect to the fatigue of the welded structures of the crane, but Grand
Falls had not received them. The plaintiff sued Grand Falls for breach of
an implied warranty of fitness as well as the manufacturer for negligence.
The trial judge found Grand Falls liable to the plaintiff for its damages,
but found that the former was entitled to be fully indemnified by the
manufacturer for negligence in manufacturing the crane. The manufac-
turer appealed arguing that there was insufficient evidence of negligence
and that the trial judge imposed a standard of care close to that expected
of an insurer.
Angers J.A., writing for the majority, essentially equated the finding
of a defect in the court below with a finding of negligence in the
manufacture of the crane. But, in an attempt to de-emphasize the lack of
evidence of negligence, he held that this defect only "contributed to the
loss"26 The real cause of the accident, according to him, was the
manufacturer's failure to warn a "known consumer" (Grand Falls) of the
defect. Although the manufacturer was aware of "the possibility of a
problem developing with the welding" of its cranes and was aware that
Grand Falls had purchased one of the cranes "with a potential welding
problem", there was no evidence that it had taken any steps to specifically
warn Grand Falls. Knowledge of a potential defect in the manufacture of
the crane imposed a duty upon the manufacturer to ensure that a "known
75. (1991), 116 N.B.R. (2d) 22, 80 D.L.R. (4th) 252 (C.A.), varying (1990), 106 N.B.R. (2d)
296, 67 D.L.R. (4th) 29 (Q.B.), leave to appeal to S. C.C. denied85 D.L.R. (4th) viii [hereinafter
McCain v. Grand Falls cited to D.L.R.].
76. Ibid. at 261.
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consumer" was made aware of the potential danger posed thereby.77
Service bulletins issued on two occasions were not sufficient to bring the
matter home to Grand Falls.
78
Assuming a duty to warn was owed to the plaintiff, the next question
is whether this duty was breached. I now turn to this question. As
mentioned in Part I, when the standard of liability is negligence, this
question is answered by focusing on the manufacturer's conduct in all the
circumstances and asking whether a reasonable person placed in like
circumstances would have behaved similarly. If so, the manufacturer's
conduct is adjudged reasonable and there is no liability for any harm
caused. In an action for failure to warn, however, it is apparent that many
Canadian courts are not primarily concerned with the conduct of the
manufacturers. They focus instead on the product which caused harm to
the plaintiff and only ask whether it is defective. In this respect, the
inquiry is similar in form to the question of whether a product contains a
defect in manufacture or design. It is a technical analysis, detached from
the manufacturer's conduct, and focusing solely on the nature of the
product before the court. The ultimate question is not whether the
behaviour at issue creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others, but
whether the product, detached from its manufacturer's behaviour, falls
below the standards which, at this time and place, courts declare as
minimal for consumer products. Often, a manufacturer who supplies a
product which is defective by reason of inadequate warnings will be held
liable no matter how reasonable its conduct might be by traditional
standards.
77. Once again, this case highlights the other component of foreseeability that courts
emphasize when dealing with a manufacturer's failure to warn of known defects: foreseeability
of the user of the product. Further illustrations of a manufacturer's duty to warn of known
defects in the manufacture or design of its product include Lavoie v. Poitras Gas & Oil Ltd.
(1979), 28 N.B.R. (2d) 541, 63 A.P.R. 541 (C.A.) (manufacturer having knowledge of
defective seems in a gasoline tank); Nicholson v. John Deere, supra, note 14 (manufacturer of
lawn mower must warn of a design defect creating a risk of fire once it becomes aware of said
defect); Strata Plan N38 v. Charnglow Prod., [1988] B.C.W.L.D. (manufacturer defectively
designed its barbecue so as to permit placement of propane tanks directly under barbecue and
failed to warn consumers against such use); and McEvoy v. Ford Motor Co. (1989), 17
A.C.W.S. (3d) 355, supplementary reasons at4l B.C.L.R. (2d) 224,18 A.C.W.S. (3d) 650, and
45 B.C.L.R. (2d) 363, 20 A.C.W.S. (3d) 760, affirmed by (1992), 63 B.C.L.R. (2d) 362, 88
D.L.R. (4th) 358 (sub nom. McEvoy v. Capital Motors (Pouce Coupe B.C.) Ltd.) (Canadian
distributor of a pick-up truck manufactured in the United States was aware of a defect in the
design of the park gear prior to purchase by the deceased, but took no steps to remedy the defect
or to warn consumers).
78. However, Grand Falls was held 25% responsible for not having conducted a reasonable
inspection of the crane upon its delivery.
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For the purpose of analysis, case law addressing the breach issue may
be divided into four broad categories. First, cases where the manufacturer
offers no warning whatever about a known defect in the manufacture or
design of a product which creates a risk of danger to its users. Second,
cases where the manufacturer does give some warning of a known defect.
Third, cases where the manufacturer gives no warning whatever about a
known or knowable risk inherent to the use of an otherwise properly made
and designed product-a product containing no apparent defects trace-
able to its manufacture or design. And fourth, cases where the manufac-
turer gives some warning of such a risk. The common denominator for the
first two categories is the object of the duty. In these situations, the danger
posed to consumers stems from a defect in the product traceable either to
its manufacture or to its design, and the inquiry considers whether
consumers were properly warned of this defect and its attendant danger.
The duty to warn in the other two categories has a different object. In these
contexts, the danger to consumers stems from a risk inherent in the use of
an otherwise properly made and designed product.
I begin with categories one and three, that is, where the manufacturer
has given no warning whatever of the danger stemming either from a
known defect traceable to the manufacture or design of its product, or
from some known or knowable characteristic inherent to its use. Ex-
amples of the former include Rivtow v. Washington Iron Works (no
warning of known design defect in cranes),79 Setrakov v. Winder's (no
warning of known design defect in suspension of trailer),8° and McCain
v. Grand Falls (no warning of known defect in the manufacturing of
crane).8 Examples of the latter kind include Smithson v. Saskemn Chemi-
cals (no warning on drain cleaner of knowable danger of mixing with
another drain cleaner),82 Pirie v. Merck Frosst (no warning on fertilizer
of knowable risk of bacterial soft rot to potatoes),83 and Skelhorn v.
Remington Arms Company Inc. (no warning on package of cartridges
about how to avoid injury from misfires),.'
Understandably, the question of breach is relatively straightforward
when no warning whatsoever is provided. The focus is entirely on
whether the manufacturer owed a duty to warn the plaintiff of the risk
which materialized. If such a duty arose, this conclusion is essentially
79. Supra, note 14.
80. Supra, note 73.
81. Supra, note 75.
82. Supra, note 61.
83. Supra, note 65.
84. (1989), 69 Alta L.R. (2d) 298 (C.A.) [hereinafter Skelhorn v. Remington].
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sufficient to find the manufacturer liable for damages caused by its failure
to warn. The rationale appears to be that it is negligent behaviour for a
manufacturer to fail to warn of defects in its products once it becomes
seized with this knowledge, and that it is also negligent to supply products
without warning of known or knowable dangers inherent to their use.
Such behaviour creates an unreasonable risk of harm. In short, a reason-
able manufacturer foreseeing such dangers would have behaved differ-
ently than the defendant; it would have provided at least some warning.
To this extent, courts faced with cases of the first and third categories are
relatively faithful to a negligence standard of liability. Arguably, the
reason is less that they are particularly dedicated to fault-based liability,
than that they have the fortune of dealing with facts where the respective
manufacturers have done nothing to apprise consumers of very real and
foreseeable dangers. In such situations, few would dispute that reason-
able behaviour requires at the very least some form of warning.
Having said this, the standard of liability applied in these decisions
may still be very demanding. Like negligence itself, the foreseeability
requirement at the heart of the duty to warn can be manipulated depending
on the desired result. Especially in cases involving dangers inherent in the
use of a product,85 many courts appear to give considerable weight to
circumstantial evidence and impute to the manufacturer a sometimes
85. As mentioned above, courts dealing with a failure to warn of a defect in manufacture or
design tend to limit foreseeability to the defendant's actual knowledge of the defect.
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very refined knowledge of the risk.16 These decisions are perhaps easier
to reconcile with a standard of negligence, but they nonetheless reflect a
trend towards imposing greater responsibilities on manufacturers. The
inquiry into foreseeability is naturally characterized by retrospection. In
an action for failure to warn, arisk somehow associated with aproduct has
materialized, and the question is whether it is of such nature and
magnitude that the defendant ought to have foreseen and specified it. But
in answering this question it is worth keeping in mind the insightful words
of Lord Simonds: "After the event even a fool is wise. But it is not the
hindsight of a fool; it is the foresight of the reasonable man which alone
can determine responsibility." 87 Although these decisions do not adopt a
standard of strict liability in the sense defined here, they nonetheless
sanction "stricter" liability for negligence. They demand greater fore-
sight on the part of the reasonable manufacturer than was required in the
past.
86. For two recent examples, see Pirie v. Merck Frosst, supra, note 65 and Skelhorn v.
Remington, supra, note 84. In the former, the trial judge observed that the expert witness of a
potato supplement ("Mertect") manufacturer had written an article in July of 1979, shortly
before the product was supplied to the plaintiff farmers, hinting at the risk of soft rot and
recommending ventilation in storage bins as a precautionary measure. This expert worked "in
conjunction with" the manufacturer, and thus McLellan J. found it was a "reasonable
inference" that the latter knew of the article before supplying the product to the plaintiffs. The
brochure accompanying the product never mentioned the risk of soft rot nor any other inherent
risk associated with the use of Mertect. From this evidence, the trial judge concluded that the
manufacturer "knew that increased loss from bacterial soft rot was an inherent risk associated
with the use of Mertect on potatoes that were coming wet from the field after a wet season to
be placed in storage without forced draft ventilation through the bins" (at 345). He held that
the manufacturer was under a duty to warn consumers of this danger and that it was negligent
for failing to do so. In Skelhorn v. Remington, the plaintiff was injured when attempting to
remove a.22 calibre cartridge manufactured by the defendant from his rifle following a misfire.
The cartridge exploded approximately 10 seconds after misfiring, possibly because it struck the
ejector while the plaintiff was attempting to remove it using what was described as an unsafe
method, not usually adopted by the plaintiff. The jury found no negligence in the manufacture
or design of the cartridges, but found that the manufacturer owed-and had breached-a duty
to warn about procedures to be used to avoid injury from misfires. On appeal, Irving J.A.
reviewed the evidence on the issue of warning. The only evidence was one answer given by the
manufacturer's expert witness. During cross-examination of this witness, plaintiff's counsel
read an excerpt from "The American Rifleman" magazine to the effect that one ought to ensure
that no protuberance might hit the cartridge's rim when attempting to dislodge a misfired
cartridge, and asked (at 302): "Would you agree that that is good advice?" The expert witness
replied "That's good advice." Based on this answer, Irving J.A. concluded "[t]here was
evidence permitting the jury to find that the [manufacturer] was negligent by failing to give an
appropriate general warning about extraction and ejection of unfired cartridges" (at 302). In
both cases, the plaintiffs were held contributorily negligent and were assigned with 50% and
80% of the blame, respectively.
87. Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. (The Wagon Mound),
[1961] A.C. 388 at 424, [1961] 1 All E.R. 404 (P.C.).
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I now address cases of the second category. Here, unlike the first
category of cases, the manufacturer makes some attempt to warn consum-
ers of the defect discovered in its product, either before supplying the
product or afterwards. Manufacturers commonly issue service bulletins
to distributors and sometimes directly to consumers, warning of various
defects and requesting that remedial measures be taken. A warning can
also appear on the product's packaging or in an accompanying manual.
The ultimate warning in this category occurs when the product is recalled
by the manufacturer for repairs or replacement. Here, the inquiry into
whether the manufacturer has breached its duty to warn becomes more
involved. It is no longer sufficient to concentrate on foreseeability of the
risk and answer that the manufacturer failed to warn of a risk which was
foreseen. Indeed, the manufacturer has made an attempt to fulfil its duty
and the court must now evaluate this effort. Theory dictates that the focus
be on the manufacturer's behaviour viewed through the spectacles of a
reasonable person. But Canadian courts are gradually departing from this
standard in such cases. Instead, they judge the manufacturer's efforts by
focusing solely on the product at issue and asking whether the warning
was adequate. In my view, the question of adequacy along with the
inquiry which it necessarily entails has led Canadian courts closer to
adopting a defacto standard of strict liability.
I did not find any reported decision in which the manufacturer gave a
warning of a known defect where the warning was judged adequate to
discharge its duty. Many defendants have made this argument. Indeed,
the question of warning is raised not only by the plaintiff as a basis of
liability, but increasingly by the manufacturer in order to excuse its
conduct. To date, courts have dismissed such claims and have adopted a
very strict approach on the adequacy issue. Some courts have ventured
further, suggesting that even if a warning about a defect is adequate in the
circumstances, it does not automatically dissolve liability for supplying
a defective product. According to them, just because a manufacturer
warns of known defects, it does not necessarily follow that it should
escape liability for the underlying failure to manufacture or design the
product carefully.
Nicholson v. John Deere Ltd.8s provides a good illustration of these
directions. The plaintiffs lost their home following a fire in May of 1981.
On the day of the accident, one plaintiff was in the garage refilling the fuel
tank of their garden and lawn riding mower purchased second hand in
1975, and manufactured by one of the defendants in 1967. The tractor's
88. Supra, note 14.
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gas tank was located within close proximity of its battery. This particular
model (model 112) came from the assembly line equipped with covered
battery terminals, unlike its predecessor (model 110), but consumers and
service people usually removed these covers. The plaintiff placed the
tank's metal cap on the flat surface of the tank during the refuelling. The
cap was instable partly because of a 15 cm. metal stick attached thereto
which belonged at the time of manufacture to a fuel-gauge system no
longer in working condition. The cap began to roll in the direction of the
battery and some part of it came into contact with the uncovered positive
battery terminal, causing a spark that ignited gasoline vapours which had
gathered in the area. A fire ensued and the plaintiffs' home was destroyed.
They sued the manufacturer of-the tractor for negligent design and for
failing to warn about the risk of fire caused by the close proximity of the
exposed battery and the fuel tank. They also sued the person who had
repaired their tractor on several occasions for negligent servicing and
failure to warn.
The trial judge found that the plaintiff in question had behaved
reasonably both before and after the accident. The sole cause of the fire
was the close proximity of the exposed positive battery terminal to the
fuel reservoir. In this respect, Smith J.found the manufacturer negligent
on two alternative grounds. First, the placement of the battery and the tank
in relation to each other represented a design defect creating an unreason-
able risk of fire.89 Alternatively, the manufacturer had failed to meet its
duty to warn of this defect, once it became known. This was based on the
assumption that it might be "casting too heavy a burden on the manufac-
turer given the state of art"'90 to hold that it ought to have known of the
defect at the time of manufacture-a pre-condition to recovery under
both grounds. However, once the manufacturer acquired this knowledge,
it had a duty to warn consumers. There was evidence showing that the
manufacturer had knowledge of the defect after the product's manufac-
ture. Besides equipping the model 112 with a battery cover, the manufac-
turer issued the following warnings: the operator's manual "warned
unequivocally and in several places against allowing sparks or flames
near a charged battery", warned of not touching the battery with any metal
objects during refuelling, and spoke of making sure that the positive
battery terminal was covered with a rubber boot; a green label placed on
89. This defect was sufficient to allow the plaintiffs to recover in full for their losses,
regardless of any warnings given by the manufacturer. Indeed, according to Smith J., that the
manufacturer may have eventually warned of the problem ought not to discharge it from
liability for the underlying defect. Supra, note 14 at 549.
90. Ibid. at 547.
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the fuel tank was marked "danger" and repeated the warnings included in
the manual; in early 1980 the manufacturer issued a battery cover safety
kit and implemented a programme to advise users of models 110 and 112
of the hazard-it placed newspaper advertisements and sent unregistered
letters to known original users and to territory managers and service
managers informing them of the programme and urging users to have the
safety kit installed; and, a "tagging parts" programme was implemented
in conjunction with its dealers in the spring of 1981 whereby parts
indigenous to the tractors at issue would be affixed with a card describing
the potential problem.
In reviewing the manufacturer's efforts to warn consumers, Smith J.
makes it clear that the duty to warn is extremely stringent.9' With respect
to the warnings given, he found the following: the plaintiffs' second hand
tractor did not come with an owner's manual; the decal might not have
been in place on the plaintiffs' tractor and, in any event, it "should have
been of a red and white combination" instead of green;92 both the manual
and the warning "lack the specificity required of the warning which the
ever-evolving law of products liability demands of manufacturers of
dangerous products";93 only a small fraction (15 %) of owners targeted by
the letters and advertisements were being reached and a sense of urgency
was not transmitted to dealers; and, the tagging programme was "ambi-
tious although largely unsuccessful" because it did not begin early
enough in the year and did not follow up with dealers more aggressively.
Thus, he held that the manufacturer had breached its duty to wam. 94
Smith J.'s reasons focus exclusively on the nature of the warnings
given, and place the extremely stringent standard of "ensuring" that users,
even second hand purchasers like the plaintiffs, are made aware of a
design defect.95 One is left to wonder what other reasonable actions a
reasonably prudent manufacturer ought to have taken in the circum-
91. Supra, note 14 at 547 ("the burden upon the manufacturer is a heavy one of ensuring that
the danger is brought home to the consumer") and at 549 ("duty to devise a programme that
left nothing to chance") [emphasis in original].
92. Ibid. at 548.
93. Ibid. at 549.
94. Smith J. also found the repairer liable in negligence for not bringing the danger to the
attention of the plaintiffs when the tractor was serviced in May of 1981: ibid. at 550-51. In other
words, the manufacturer's efforts were sufficient to shift some responsibility for the loss to the
repairer (who became aware of the safety kit programme), but not to the plaintiffs (who
apparently did not). On this point, see also Qlshaski Farms Ltd. v. Skene Farm Equipment Ltd.
(1987), 49 Alta L.R. (2d) 249, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 691 (Q.B.).
95. It is noteworthy that the manufacturer's foreseeability of the plaintiff in Nicholson v. John
Deere Ltd. was not as manifest as in the cases discussed earlier with respect to the duty issue.
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stances? Clearly, the manufacturer's conduct in attempting to warn
consumers of the danger was reasonable, but such was not the focus of the
inquiry. Nicholson v. John Deere Ltd. demonstrates the extent to which
Canadian products liability law is indeed "ever-evolving". However,
contrary to what Smith J. appears willing to admit, at least with respect
to failure to warn it is evolving in the direction of strict liability.
Another example from the second category is Can-Arc Helicopters
Ltd. v. Textron Inc 96 In October of 1987, a helicopter owned by one
plaintiff and leased by the other was severely damaged when it made an
emergency landing following a sudden loss of power due to the failure of
a gear. The helicopter was manufactured by one defendant and serviced
by the other. The gear failure was linked to the chromium plating used,
which weakened the gear and which was contrary to the manufacturer's
design specifications. The design was improved and, in April of 1987, the
manufacturer issued a service bulletin recommending inspection of all
engines and installation of the new gear. The bulletin "recommended"
that the replacement be done on all installed gearboxes "at next return to
an authorized service centre" and on all spare gearboxes prior to instal-
lation. It warned that "[n]on-compliance with this Service Bulletin can
result in gearbox failure causing complete loss of power". In July of 1987,
the helicopter in question was taken to the second defendant for another
purpose where it was inspected and released as serviceable without any
alterations to the gearbox.
The trial judge found that the gear's failure was principally due to its
negligent manufacture. Unlike in Nicholson v. John Deere Ltd., there
were no doubts about the manufacturer's knowledge at the time of
manufacture. Paris J. then suggested that the manufacturer would "not be
liable to a user if it gives clear warning [...] and the user suffers damage
by carelessly disregarding that warning".97 He found that the -service
bulletin did not constitute an adequate warning to people such as the
plaintiffs, "particularly users who brought their engines into a servicing
agent's facilities to be tested but not necessarily to be repaired or
96. (1991), 63 B.C.L.R. (2d) 207,86 D.L.R. (4th) 404 (S.C.) [hereinafter Can-Arc v. Textron
cited to D.L.R.].
97. Ibid. at 414. This is less drastic than Smith J.'s view inNicholson v.John Deere Ltd.,supra,
note 14 at 549, that no amount of specificity could excuse a manufacturer who places a known
defective product into the market. Despite their difference in tone, Paris J. ultimately took a
similarly strict approach with respect to the warnings given by the manufacturer.
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overhauled". 9 Paris J. also believed that the phrase "it is recommended"
did not sufficiently convey the urgency of the situation. A phrase such as
"to be accomplished" ought to have been used. In the end, the warning
was "confusing" because it did not require the customer to take immedi-
ate action, but warned of the serious consequences of not doing so.
Interestingly, the trial judge then turned to the conduct of the plaintiff
lessee and held that it was contributorily negligent in not doing anything
about the service bulletin. Although the warning was confusing, "the
bulletin did contain a specific requirement, namely, that the bevel gear be
replaced, and it warned that the failure to do so could result in a complete
loss of power".99 Thus, a warning inadequate to fulfil the manufacturer's
duty to warn was nonetheless able to convey enough knowledge of the
risk to the consumer to make the latter contributorily negligent.10
Lastly, I discuss cases falling within the fourth category outlined
earlier, that is, those where the manufacturer makes some effort to warn
about a known or knowable risk inherent to the use of an otherwise
properly made and designed product. By far, most reported cases fall in
this category and the vast majority of these decisions hold the relevant
warning was inadequate in the circumstances. True, "courts appear to be
demanding more explicit warnings than in the past".0 1 But, in my view,
the reason for this is that a noticeable trend towards the adoption of de
facto strict liability is under way. The propensity to decide the question
of breach regardless of fault was influenced by the decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in.Lambert v. Lastoplex, a case discussed
earlier with respect to the duty issue.10 2 There, Laskin J. focused almost
98. Can-Arc v. Textron, ibid. This distinction between types of users is puzzling. Are users
who have their engines tested an identifiably different group from those who have them
repaired or overhauled, so that the manufacturer could have taken specific actions vis-a-vis the
former? Paris J. made this distinction because of evidence showing that the practice in the
helicopter industry was to not comply with service bulletins when an engine is returned for
testing (as it was in this case) unless the engine is repaired or overhauled afterwards. How does
such a practice affect the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct? More importantly,
what measures could the manufacturer have taken to "bring the danger home" to users such as
the plaintiffs who would return the engine only for testing? The service bulletin recommended
to make the changes on the "next return to an authorized service centre". Was this not
sufficiently clear to apply to all users, regardless of individual motives for having an engine
serviced? The trial judge believed this language was less precise and imperative than other
bulletins issued by the manufacturer using words such as "returned for any reason" and
"returned for repair or overall": ibid. at 415. In terms of the behaviour expected of a reasonable
person, is there a meaningful difference between "next return" and "return for any reason"?
99. Ibid. at 415.
100. The trial judge apportioned the responsibility between the lessee of the helicopter and
the manufacturer at 40% and 60% respectively.
101. Waddams, supra, note 2 at 54.
102. Supra, notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
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exclusively on the quality of the product supplied in order to decide
whether the manufacturer had breached its duty to warn. The Court did
not seem particularly concerned with the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct in all the circumstances, but rather with a
technical analysis of whether the product met certain minimal standards
of safety. To be sure, the manufacturer's labels did not specifically warn
against leaving pilot lights on, in or near the working area, unlike the
warning attached to a similar product sold by a competitor. In this respect,
there was some evidence on which to judge the manufacturer negligent
sirnce it knew of a hazard associated with the use of its product and its
behaviour was below that of another manufacturer faced with similar
circumstances. The reasons of the Court, however, focus solely on the
explicitness of the labels attached to the product. After announcing
guiding principles,103 Laskin J. held that the cautions on the labels "lacked
the explicitness which the degree of danger in its use in a gas-serviced
residence demanded"."0 That is, the labels did not warn against sparks or
specifically against leaving pilot lights on, in or near the working area. Of
course, I am not suggesting that this case was wrongly decided since, as
mentioned, there was evidence of negligence. But the preoccupation in
the Court's reasons with the specific language of the labels announced a
shift in emphasis from the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct
to the defective nature of the product.
Using a similar analysis, the second manufacturer involved in Smithson
v. Saskem Chemicals was held liable for breaching its duty to warn of the
knowable danger of using its product in conjunction with another
chemical drain cleaner:105 This conclusion was reached despite the fact
that its product was marked corrosive pursuant to federal regulations,
indicated that it contained sulphuric acid, and cautioned to "not use [the
product] where other drain chemicals are present". Noble J. was troubled
by the size of the print used for the label, by the fact that no percentage
for the content of sulphuric acid was given, and by the absence of a
specific warning about the type of risk which could materialize should the
product be used in the presence of another drain cleaner. Interestingly, in
rejecting an argument of contributory negligence based on this warning,
103. Supra, note 14 at 125. First, a general warning will not suffice where the likelihood of
the danger may be increased according to the surroundings in which it is expected that the
product will be used. Second, the required explicitness of a warning will vary with the danger
likely to be encountered in the ordinary use of the product.
104. Ibid.
105. Supra, notes 61-62 and accompanying text. As noted, the first manufacturer was held
liable for not giving any warning whatever. Both defendants were held jointly and severally
liable for the plaintiffs' losses.
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no mention is made of the label's failure to fully apprise the consumer of
the situation. Instead, Noble J. held it was not reasonable to suggest that
the plaintiff should have known that some of the first product would still
be present when the second product was applied four days later.
The Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Buchan v. OrthoO6 also
played an instrumental role in pointing the law of failure to warn in the
direction of a de facto standard of strict liability. There, the plaintiff
suffered a stroke which left her partially paralysed. The evidence at trial
established that the stroke was caused by the use of oral contraceptives
manufactured and distributed by the defendant company and prescribed
by her doctor. The defendant manufacturer knew of this risk, but did not
warn doctors or patients and the plaintiff sued for negligence. The often-
quoted principle on the issue of breach is couched in language of
reasonableness. 7 Nonetheless, it calls for a technical analysis of the
product and its defective nature, rather than an inquiry into the reason-
ableness of the choices made by the manufacturer. This principle requires
a comparison not between the conduct of the manufacturer and that of the
reasonable person placed in similar circumstances, but between the
product in question and what courts consider to be minimal standards of
safety.
In Buchan v. Ortho, Robins J.A. discussed at some length the "learned
intermediary" rule. Ordinarily, the manufacturer's warning must be
addressed directly to the person likely to be injured. However, in cases
involving prescription drugs, an exception provides that the duty to warn
is discharged if the manufacturer gives prescribing physicians adequate
warnings. In obiter, Robins J.A. said the general rule should be applied
to the specific case of oral contraceptives as the rationales for the
exception were not supported in this context.108 In this respect, although
the manufacturer had complied with federal regulations requiring the
inclusion of explanatory statements with their products, the warning
given to consumers was not adequate to fully apprise them of the risk of
stroke associated with oral contraceptives. The warning was general in
tone and told patients to turn to their prescribing physicians for details. In
106. Supra, note 63.
107. Ibid. at 667: "Once a duty to warn is recognized, it is manifest that the warning must be
adequate. It should be communicated clearly and understandably in a manner calculated to
inform the user of the nature of the risk and the extent of the danger; it should be in terms
commensurate with the gravity of the potential hazard, and it should not be neutralized or
negated by collateral efforts on the part of the manufacturer. The nature and extent of any given
warning will depend on what is reasonable having regard to all the facts and circumstances
relevant to the product in question."
108. Ibid. at 688-89.
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any event, on the assumption that the learned intermediary rule applied,
Robins J.A. found that the warnings given to physicians at the material
time did not satisfy the standard.
Reviewing the information intended for doctors given by the manufac-
turer, 9 Robins J.A. held that none contained any warning or made any
mention of the risk of stroke associated with the use of oral contracep-
tives. In this respect, the Court emphasized that the manufacturer's sister
company in the United States offered much more detailed information
about thromboembolic complications in oral contraceptive users. Robins
J.A. also discussed certain "factors" relevant to a drug manufacturer's
duty to warn such as its expert status in the field and attendant duty to keep
abreast of scientific developments pertaining to its product through
research, adverse reaction reports, and scientific literature. This manu-
facturer must "be forthright" and "tell the whole story"; it must provide
doctors with "current, accurate and complete information about a drug's
risks"."' 0 The adequacy of a warning mustbejudgedby what is reasonable
in the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury, the seriousness
of the danger, the number of people potentially affected, the nature of the
drug, and the necessity for taking it. According to Robins J.A., the
circumstances in this case indicated that the manufacturer had failed to
give the medical profession warnings commensurate with its knowledge.
The manufacturer argued that its actions were "reasonable in the circum-
stances" since it knew that a 44 page report providing, in essence, the
same information as that given in the United States was circulated to each
practising physician in Canada before the accident, pursuant to the
Minister of Health and Welfare's direction, and that the physician in
question had received and reviewed said report. This argument was
rejected on the ground that the manufacturer had to warn physicians itself
and could not delegate this duty to others in the field. Moreover, a more
stringent duty to warn was neither inconsistent with the report in question
nor precluded by it11 ; apparently, neither is it one of the circumstances to
be taken into account injudging the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
conduct.
Rothwell v. Raes"12 also provides a good illustration of the current
tendency. The infant plaintiff was one of two twins, the other of whom
109. This information was contained in the following: the Compendium of Pharmaceuticals
and Specialties published annually by the Canadian Pharmaceutical Association; file cards
describing the defendant's products; sales bulletins issued by the defendant's sales represen-
tatives; and, general literature intended for distribution to patients through doctors.
110. Supra, note 63 at 678.
111. Ibid.at681.
112. Supra, note 64.
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was stillborn. At three, four, and five months, the plaintiff received
immunization doses against a number of common diseases. Shortly after
his third shot, the plaintiff began suffering from a developmental abnor-
mality and ultimately became blind, almost deaf, and severely mentally
disabled. He sued, among others, the manufacturer of the vaccine for
failing to warn of the adverse reactions associated with the administration
of the vaccine. The action was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff
failed to prove a causal connection between the vaccine and the damage
suffered by the plaintiff.1 3 For my purposes, the interesting part of the
reasons deals with the discussion, in arguendo, of the manufacturer's
negligence. OslerJ. found that the manufacturer was aware of a "possible
link" between the administration of its product and the danger in question.
According to him, the warning given stating that "it has been reported on
rare occasions that uncontrolled screaming and/or convulsions, some-
times followed by neurological complication, have resulted from the
injection of pertussis vaccine" was inadequate in the light of Buchan v.
Ortho to warn against this "possible link". It should have been more
detailed and should have outlined the medical and scientific information
relied on in assessing the risks. Thus, while the mere possibility of a
causal connection between the product and the materialization of the risk
was insufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of proving causation, it
was sufficient to require the manufacturer to give warnings outlining this
"possible" risk with greater detail than currently provided.
Lastly, I mention Chase v. Goodyear.1 4 There, the plaintiff service
station worker brought an action in negligence against the defendant tire
manufacturer after being severely injured when a tire exploded during
inflation. The tire was approximately three years old and was advertised
as suitable for retreading. The trial judge admitted there were "too many
unknowns in this case" with respect to the use made of the tire during its
various lives. It was known that the tire had been inspected and retreaded
once by the manufacturer, that it had been transferred on several occa-
sions before reaching the garage where the plaintiff worked, and that it
was at the end of its retreaded life on the day of the accident. General
warnings and instructions regarding the inflation of tires were given, such
as a warning to stand clear and to use a tire cage or chains so that the lock
ring would not pop out during inflation. However, these were judged to
113. The Court of Appeal affirmed this finding, holding that the mere "possibility" of a causal
connection is not enough to meet the burden of proof with respect to causation: (1990), 2 O.R.
(3d) 332,76 D.L.R. (4th) 280 (C.A.).
114. Supra, note 65. No mention is made of New Brunswick's Consumer Product Warranty
and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, but the reasons of the trial judge suggest that proof
of negligence was considered essential to recovery.
338 The Dalhousie Law Journal
be insufficient to warn of the specific possibility of a latent weakness in
the radial cords. In arevealing statement, the trial judge concluded: "If the
claim were one solely for a breach of warranty I would dismiss it because
I do not believe the plaintiff has proven such a case. Counsel for the
plaintiff has properly stressed in my opinion the claim as one for failing
to warn the plaintiff that the radial cords may have gradually weakened
through overdeflection while the tire has been in use, that the sidewalls
may explode while being inflated and that anybody inflating the tire
should use the clip-on air chuck and stand well away when the tire is being
inflated.
115
B. The Situation in the United States
In the United States, negligence and strict liability have both, to varying
degrees, received judicial recognition as viable theories of liability in
actions based on a manufacturer's failure to warn. In virtually every state,
negligently failing to warn of a known or knowable non-obvious danger
is, like in Canada, a recognized ground for holding a manufacturer
tortiously liable.116 Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
states that the "supplier" of a product is subject to liability for negligently
failing to warn foreseeable users, provided: that it knew or had reason to
know that its product is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which
it is supplied; that it had no reason to believe that those for whose use the
product is supplied will realize its dangerous condition; and, that it failed
"to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or
of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous".' 1 7 The first two
conditions are directed to the manufacturer's foreseeability of the risk and
to the obviousness of the danger, hence to the question of whether a duty
to warn arose. The third condition is directed to whether this duty, if it
arose, was breached in the circumstances of the case. In this respect, the
analysis under § 388 is virtually identical to that suggestedby the standard
of liability adopted by courts in the Canadian common law provinces.
115. Ibid. at 187.
116. See, forexample, Tivombleyv. Fuller-Brush, 221 Md. 475,158 A.2d 110 (1960);Martin
v. Bengue Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957); Tomao v. A.P. De Sanno & Son, 209 F.2d
544 (3d Cir. 1954); Dempsey v. Virginia Dare Stores Inc., 186 S.W.2d 217 (Mo.App. 1945);
Moran v. Faberge Inc., 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975); Temple v. Wean United Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d
317, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977); and Carterv. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64N.E.2d 693 (1946).
See generally Products Liability Reporter, vol. 1, 1750; W.L. Prosser, Handbook on the Law
of Torts, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1971) at 646-47; Dillard & Hart, "Products Liability:
Directions for use and the Duty to Warn" (1955) 41 Va. L. Rev. 145; and Madden, supra,
note 63.
117. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 388 (1965).
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In addition, courts in many states have recognized that a plaintiff
suffering damages allegedly because of a failure to warn may also plead
his or her case in strict liability." 8 As noted, the vast majority of states
have adopted, either judicially or legislatively, a principle of strict
products liability in tort modeled on § 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts.l"9 Inspired by the general trend towards strict products liability
and by several of the official comments following § 402A, a number of
courts have recognized a strict liability action for failure to warn. In this
respect, Comment h provides that the defective condition of a product
may arise, inter alia, "from the way in which the product is prepared or
packed" and that, although a product is not in a defective condition when
safe for normal handling and consumption, a manufacturer who:
"has reason to anticipate that danger may result from a particular use ...
may be required to give adequate warning of the danger (see Comment j),
and a product sold without such warning is in a defective condition". 20
Commentj to § 402A states that in order to prevent a product from being
unreasonably dangerous, "the seller may be required to give directions or
warning, on the container, as to its use." It specifies that no warnings are
required with respect to common allergies as consumers will reasonably
be aware of them, but adds that where the product:
"contains an ingredient to which a substantial number of the population
are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally known,
or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not expect to find
in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he has
knowledge, orby the application of reasonable, developed human skilland
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the
danger.'
121
Finally, Comment k deals with "unavoidably unsafe products", such as
drugs and vaccines, and provides that these products are not defective nor
unreasonably dangerous when "properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warnings". 122 Somewhat ironically, two of the
comments used to support the extension of strict liability to warning
defects were later invoked in order to limit the manufacturer's duty to
foreseeable risks, 12 a development believed by some to repudiate any
meaningful distinction between strict liability and negligence.
24
118. See generally Products Liability Reporter, vol. 1, 4095 and the cases noted, infra.
119. Supra, note 40.
120. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), Comment h [emphasis added].
121. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), Comment j [emphasis added].
122. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), Comment k.
123. See the portions of Comment h and Commentj with added emphasis, supra, notes 125
and 126 respectively.
124. See, for example, Henderson & Twerski, supra, note 34 and Wertheimer, supra, note 4.
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While adding to a plaintiff's arsenal of arguments, the existence of
alternative theories of liability for failure to warn has created much
confusion in the United States amongst litigants, judges, juries, and
commentators."Z This has led to criticisms and calls for either substantial
reform of existing doctrine or an outright rejection of strict liability for
warning defects. 126 The true value of a strict liability cause of action,
beyond what is already provided by the law of negligence, has been
seriously questioned. With respect to manufacturing defects, the ques-
tions facing courts and legislatures south of the Canadian border have
been relatively straightforward since the 1960s: whether to follow the
trend initiated by Greenman 27 and codified in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts by adopting a standard of strict liability and, if so, whether the
product supplied by the defendant at bar contained a defect in manufac-
ture making it unreasonably dangerous to consumers. Both the doctrinal
and practical implications of the choice were-and still are-evident.
The concept of a defect in manufacture is simple and intuitively under-
stood, especially in cases involving food and beverage products. By
definition, it does not require reference to the conduct or mental process
of the manufacturer. 121 Moreover, it is easy to see what is removed from
the analysis when a move to strict liability is made. In negligence, the
plaintiff must prove not only the existence of a manufacturing defect, but
that the manufacturer behaved negligently in allowing this defect to
develop, for example, by not taking adequate preventive measures such
as quality control testing and continual monitoring of the production line.
125. An example of this confusion is provided by two recent decisions. In Oanes v. Westgo
Inc., 476 N.W.2d 248 at 253 (N.D. 1991), the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that: "In
a strict liability failure-to-warn case, the focus is on whether the warnings, if any, which
accompany a product are adequate so that the product is not unreasonably dangerous to the
ordinary user. The focus is not on the knowledge or reasonableness of the conduct of the
manufacturer or seller." According to the Court, the trial judge who spoke of the manufacturer's
foreseeability erroneously "injected negligence concepts about the manufacturer's knowledge
into the strict liability failure-to-warn claim". Mr. Justice Meschke, in dissent on this point,
suggested that: "The complications brought about by dual theory cases like this one
demonstrate that we should merge strict liability and negligence ... Altogether, today's
majority opinion vividly illustrates the need to combine and simplify strict liability and
negligence doctrine for submission to ajury" (ibid. at 255-56). Conversely, the Supreme Court
of California recognized in Anderson v. Owens-Corning, supra, note 34 that a manufacturer's
knowledge (actual or constructive) was relevant to a strict liability failure to warn action at the
stage of determining whether aduty to warn was owed. Mr. Justice Mosk dissented on this point
and noted, among other things, that if this was indeed the state of the law, then: "We should
consider the possibility of holding that failure-to-warn actions lie solely on a negligence
theory"(ibid at 563).
126. See, for example, Henderson & Twerskd, supra, note 34 and Wertheimer, supra, note 4.
127. Supra, note 46.
128. Supra, note 14.
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In this respect, there are many decisions involving the maxim of res ipsa
loquitur serving as a reminder of what is at stake for the plaintiff.2 9 For
these reasons, courts in strict liability states have had few difficulties in
applying their standard to manufacturing defect cases and in differenti-
ating this standard from fault-based liability. Any debate about the
appropriateness of strict liability in this context focuses almost exclu-
sively on its policy rationales.
With respect to failures to warn, however, the situation is quite
different. Here, the debate surrounding failure to warn ventures beyond
policy analysis and is characterized-especially recently-by doctrinal
complexity focusing on whether there are any meaningful distinctions
between strict liability and negligence when applied to warning defects.
Even assuming that the rationales advanced in Escola130 and Greenman
persuade a court that strict products liability should be adopted in theory,
the question remains whether actual changes to a plaintiff's cause of
action will be such as to warrant an alternate theory of liability. If not,
recognizing strict liability failure to warn can only lead to confusion, to
a waste of precious judicial resources, and to an eventual frustration of
otherwise commendable goals. The answer may have been obvious in the
context of manufacturing defects but, as recent case law demonstrates,
courts may have been too presumptuous in assuming that the same
simplicity extended to all types of defects.
Generally speaking, courts have taken three related positions with
respect to this issue. A minority of courts directly asked the question and,
failing to see any practical difference between both standards, refused to
adopt strict liability with respect to defects in warning. 3' The other two
approaches, encompassing a majority of states, recognize strict liability
failure to warn but differ in the manner in which they differentiate it from
negligence. Some courts recognized, mostly in earlier decisions and often
in obiter dicta, that the distinction relates to the manufacturer's
foreseeability of the risk associated with its product. In this respect, a
view articulated by some courts is that while a plaintiff must prove that
the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger which
materialized in order to trigger a duty to warn in negligence-based
liability, its knowledge of the risk is either conclusively presumed or
129. This maxim, in effect, allows aplaintiffto succeed in negligence even though no direct
proof of negligence is adduced: see generally Waddams, supra, note 2 at 61-65. Notice how
it is usually invoked in cases dealing with manufacturing defects.
130. Supra, note 45.
131. See, for example, Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1976 (5th Cir.
1973); Higgins v. E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 671 F.Supp. 1055 (D.Md. 1987); and
Overbee v. Van Waters & Rogers, 706 F.2d 768 (6th Cir. 1983).
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simply immaterial in the context of strict liability. 13 2 Beyond this, they
make little effort in differentiating the theories and some concede that
both are essentially the same on the issue of breach. 133 A third and
increasingly popular view states the difference between these theories in
the exact opposite manner. Here, foreseeability of risk is relevant in the
context of strict liability in determining whether or not a duty to warn is
owed, as it is in the context of negligence.1 34 Rather, it is in considering
whether or not this duty has been breached that both theories part, the
former focusing solely on the adequacy of the warning and the latter
132. See, forexample, Beshadav. Johns-Manville Products Corp.,90 N.J. 191,447 A.2d539
(1982) [hereinafter Beshada v. Johns-Manville cited to A.2d] (conclusively presuming the
manufacturer's knowledge of the risk-a reasoning later modified and limited to its facts in
Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984)); Johnson v. Raybestos-
Manhattan Inc., 69 Haw. 287, 740 P.2d 548 (1987) (manufacturer's foreseeability of risk
irrelevantto any theory ofstrict liability); Oanesv. Westgo Inc., supra, note 125 (manufacturer's
knowledge of the danger is assumed in strict liability and hence foreseeability of the risk is
irrelevant to strict liability failure to wam);Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 P.2d 1337 (Wash.
1991) (manufacturer's foreseeability of risk irrelevant to strict liability failure to warn);
Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110 (La. 1986) (same); and Phillips v.
Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (same).
133. Beshada v. Johns-Manville, ibid.
134. See "Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liability for Failure to Warn as Dependent
on Defendant's Knowledge of Danger" (1984), 33 A.L.R. (4th) 368. This annotation reviews
case law from 1970 to 1984 and concludes (at371): "Often citing the above position [Comment
j] of the Restatement, the courts for the most part, in jurisdictions generally espousing the
doctrine of strict liability (when a negligence theory is applied, there is no question that actual
or constructive knowledge is an essential element), hold'that liability based upon a failure to
wam users of a product's inherently dangerous quality or characteristic may be imposed only
where the manufacturer, distributor, or seller, as the case may be, had actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous quality or characteristic." Recent high court decisions adopting
this "majority" view, not mentioned in this often-cited annotation, includeAnderson v. Owens-
Coming, supra, note 34; Fibreboard Corporation v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1993);
Shanks v. The Upjohn Company, 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992); Bernierv. Raymark Industries
Inc., 516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986); Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th
Cir. 1986); Owens Illinois Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992); Anderson v.
Owens-Illinois Inc., 799 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986); Thomas v. Amway Corporation, 488 A.2d 716
(R.I. 1985); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988); and Ellis v.
Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, 545 A.2d 906 (Pa. 1988). A number of states have passed
statutes which, in effect, forbid liability under strict liability failure to warn unless the danger
which materialized was known or knowable to the manufacturer and its industry at the time of
supply. This is done usually by allowing a manufacturer to introduce evidence of the state of
the art at the time of supply to establish, as an affirmative defence, that the danger in question
was neither known nor knowable at the time of supply: see, for example, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-
116-104(a)(1) (1987); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(1)(a) (1987); Conn. Den. Stat. Ann. § 52-
572q(b)(3) (1991); Ind. Code Ann. § 33-1-1.5-4(b)(4) (1983); Iowa Code Ann. § 668.12
(1987); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.310(2) (1992); La. Rev. Stat. Ann, § 9:2800.59 (1991); Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 537.764(2) (1988); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,182 (1989); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
507:8-g (1991); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.76(A)(1)(a) (1991); and Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-
28-105(b) (1980).
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considering the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct.135 Stated
somewhat differently, the difference between the second and third
approaches lies in the stage at which a distinction is perceived; the second
argues the only real difference is encountered when inquiring whether a
duty to warn was owed, whereas the third invokes the distinction when
inquiring whether or not the duty was breached. To add to the confusion,
some states like New Jersey appear to shift from one approach to another,
never giving clear reasons for their departures. 13 6 Furthermore, among the
growing number of states now recognizing the relevance offoreseeability
in strict liability failure to warn, there is a renewed questioning about the
appropriateness of maintaining any distinction between this action and
the analogous one based on negligence.
3 7
Having said this, I turn to a more detailed discussion of the inquiry into
whether the manufacturer owed a duty to warn of risks associated with the
use of its products. With respect to negligent failure to warn, courts in the
United States engage in a similar analysis to that found in Canadian
judgments on the threshold duty issue. The focus is almost entirely on the
manufacturer's foreseeability of the risk which materialized and alleg-
edly caused damage to the plaintiff, whether said risk is inherent in the use
of the product or associated to a defect in its manufacture or design. A
manufacturer has a duty to warn only of dangers which are known, or
should have been known, at the time of supply. 38 Occasionally, a post-
supply duty to warn will be triggered when the manufacturer acquires
knowledge of an earlier unknown risk, as when it becomes apparent that
its products contain a dangerous design or manufacturing defect.139 In
most cases, it seems to be assumed that the manufacturer could foresee
the plaintiff as a possible user of its product, although some cases,
especially those where the risk is traceable to a defect in manufacture or
135. See, for example, Anderson v. Owens-Corning, supra, note 34 at 558-59; Fibreboard
Corp. v. Fenton, ibid. at 1175; Shanks v. Upjohn Company, ibid. at 1199-1200; and Ellis v.
Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, ibid. at 913-14.
136. Compare Beshada v. Johns-Manville, supra, note 132 with Feldman v. Lederle Labo-
ratories, supra, note 132 and Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 125 N.J. 117, 529 A.2d 1176
(1991).
137. See, for example, the dissenting opinions noted supra, note 130; Henderson & Twersid,
supra, note 34; and M.J. Bromberg, "The Mischief of the Strict Liability Label in the Law of
Warnings" (1987), 17 Seton Hall L. Rev. 526.
138. See, forexample, Restatement(Second) ofTorts § 388(a) (1965);Riversv. Stihllnc.,434
So.2d 766 (Ala. 1983); Payne v. Soft Sheen Prods. Inc., 486 A.2d 712 (D.C. 1985); Jarrel v.
Monsantano Co., 528 N.E.2d 1158 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988); and Mitchell v. Sky Climber Inc., 487
N.E.2d 1374 (Mass. 1986).
139. See, for example, Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163,99 N.W.2d 627
(1959); Smith v. Selco Products Inc., 385 S.E.2d 173 (N.C.C.A. 1989); and the articles noted
infra, note 146.
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design of the product, spend more time discussing this issue.140Finally, as
in Canada, the scope of the duty is limited to non-obvious dangers 4' and
does not extend to all unintended uses or misuses of a product.
142
With respect to strict liability failure to warn, courts in a majority of
states have retained both the form and substance of the preliminary
inquiry into whether or not the manufacturer owed a duty to warn. The
manufacturer is not required to warn of dangers which are apparent or
commonly known to all reasonable people 43 and may be relieved of
warning against risks associated with unintended uses or misuses of its
product.1" More importantly, most courts now expressly recognize the
relevance of the manufacturer's foreseeability during the inquiry. 45 They
acknowledge that even under strict liability a manufacturer's duty to warn
is limited to risks which were known or knowable at the time of supply.
Under special circumstances, post-supply duties to warn, based on later-
acquired knowledge, may also arise.
146
140. See, for example, Rohrbaugh v. Owens-Coming Fibreglass Corporation, 965 F.2d 844
(10th Cir. 1992).
141. See, for example, Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266 (Ind.Ct.App. 1972);
Griebler v. Doughboy Recreational Inc., 449 N.W.2d 61 (Wis.Ct.App. 1989); Dempsey v.
Virginia Dare Stores Inc., 186 S.W.2d 217 (Mo.App. 1945); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
414 Mich. 413,326 N.W.2d 372 (1982); and Minneapolis Society of FineArts v. Parker-Klein
Associates Architects Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984). In Canada, a manufacturer is also
relieved of warning consumers of obvious dangers: see, for example, Yachetti v. John Duff&
Sons Ltd., [1942] O.R. 682, [1943] 1 D.L.R. 194 (H.C.); Schulz v. Leeside Dev. Ltd., [1978]
5 W.W.R. 620,90 D.L.R. (3d) 98 (B.C.C.A.); Moffat v. Witelson (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 7, 111
D.L.R. (3d) 712 (H.C.) and Kirby v. Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd. (1989), 57 Man. R. (2d) 207
(Q.B.).
142. See, for example, Higgens v. Paul Hardeman Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943 (Mo.Ct.App. 1970);
Darsan v. Guncalito Corp., 153 App.Div.2d 868 (N.Y. 1989); and Watters v. TSR, P.L.R.
12,474 (6th Cir. 1990). The general limit is expressed in terms of unforeseeable misuses of the
product. A similar limit is placed by Canadian courts: see Lem v. Barotto Sports Ltd. (1976),
1 A.R. 556, 69 D.L.R. (3d) 276 (C.A.); Ivan v. AOCO Ltd. (1980), 5 Sask. R. 78 (C.A.)
reversing (1979), 1 Sask. R. 198 (Q.B.) and Rae v. T. Eaton Co. (Maritimes) Ltd. (1961), 28
D.L.R. (2d) 522,45 M.P.R. 261 (N.S.S.C.).
143. See, for example, Annotation, "Failure to Warn as Basis of Liability Under Doctrine of
Strict Liability in Tort" 53 A.L.R. 3d 239 at 257 (1973 & Supp. 1989); Plante v. Habart, 771
F.2d 617 (lst Cir. 1985); Lorfano v. Dura Store Stepps Inc., P.L.R. 12,381 (Me. 1990);
Hagans v. Oliver Machinery Co., 576 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1978); and Kelley v. Rival Manufac-
turing Co., 704 F.Supp. 1039 (D.Ct. 1989).
144. See, for example, Reillyv. Dynamic Explorations, P.L.R. 112,725 (La. 1990); Robinson
v. GGCInc., P.L.R. 12,789 (Nev. 1991); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div, 49 N.Y.2d471; and
Sage v. Fairchild-Swearigen Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 579.
145. Supra, note 134.
146. See, for example, Allee, "Post-Sale Obligations of Product Manufacturers" (1984), 12
Fordham Urb. L.J. 625; Schwartz, "The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the
Road to a Reasonable Doctrine" (1983), 53 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 902; Kozlowski v. John E. Smith's
Sons Company, 87 Wis.2d 882,275 N.W.2d 915 (1979); and Walton v. Avco Corp., P.L.R.
12,144 (Pe. 1987).
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The infiltration of foreseeability of risk into strict liability failure to
warn has taken various forms. 147 As noted, some courts took the initial
position that foreseeability was not an issue under strict liability because
the manufacturer is conclusively presumed to have known about the
dangers associated with the use of its products. Stated differently, some
courts imputed knowledge of the danger to the manufacturer and pre-
cluded any evidence directed to foreseeability of the risk. 4 Beshada v.
Johns-Manville, a case involving asbestos products, was instrumental in
advancing this view. 49 However, in many instances, this position was
later judicially modified or legislatively bypassed with a rebuttable
presumption of knowledge' 50 or with a rule that knowledge of the danger
is a required element of the tort.' Some courts avoided the presumption/
imputation debate altogether, holding that foreseeability is simply imma-
terial in strict liability failure to warn, because the focus is on the product
147. Part of what is confusing about the negligence/strict liability debate with respect to
failure to warn is the different language chosen by courts and commentators. As already
evident, I have chosen to use the expressions "foreseeability" and "knowability" interchange-
ably as they essentially denote the same object: the relation between the manufacturer's state
of mind, whether actual or reasonably implied, and the risk posed by its product to consumers.
In this respect, saying that a manufacturer knew or should have known of a particular risk is
the same thing as saying that the manufacturer foresaw or could have foreseen such risk.
Similarly, the class of dangers for which a manufacturer is not required to warn may be labelled
either "unknowable" dangers (i.e. dangers that were not known nor knowable at the time of
supply) or "unforeseeable" dangers (i.e. dangers that were not foreseen nor foreseeable at the
time of supply). Lastly, when the expression "state of the art evidence" is used by courts or
commentators in this context, it merely refers to evidence that a particular risk was neither
known nor knowable (i.e. was not reasonably foreseeable) by the application of scientific
knowledge applicable at the time of supply.
148. See, forexample, Beshada v.Johns-Manville, supra, note 132 and Oanes v. Westgo Inc.,
supra, note 125.
149. Ibid. This decision was severely criticised in academic circles. See, for example, J.
Berman, "The Function of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability" (1984) 10
Am.J.L. & Med. 93; A.T. Berry, "Revolution-or Aberration-in Products Liability Law"
(1984), 52 Fordham L. Rev. 786; J.E. Keefe & R.C. Henke, "Presumed Knowledge of Danger:
Legal Fiction Gone Awry?" (1989), 19 Seton Hall L. Rev. 174; W.J. Murrsay, "Requiring
Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects" (1983), 71
Geo. L.J. 1635; and Note, "Defeat for the State-of-the-Art Defense in New Jersey Products
Liability" (1983), 14 Rutgers L.J. 953. But see Wertheimer, supra, note 4 and C.M. Placitella
& A.M. Damell, "Evolution or Revolution in Strict Products Liability?" (1983), 51 Fordham
L. Rev. 801.
150. See, for example, Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, supra, note 132 at 388, where the
Supreme Court limited the ruling of Beshada v. Johns-Manville to the facts of its case (i.e. to
asbestos decisions) and stated that the manufacturer now carries the burden "of proving that
the information was not reasonably available or obtainable and that it therefore lacked actual
or constructive knowledge of the defect". See also the statutes (except for Ohio's) notedsupra,
note 134.
151. See, for example, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.76(A)(1)(a) (1991) (a product is
defective due to inadequate warnings only if the "manufacturerknew or... should have known
about a risk").
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at issue and not the manufacturer's conduct. 152 The fact that the risk was
unknowable at the time of supply, it is said, does not detract from the
policy rationales for strict liability suggesting that the loss ought to lie
with the person who put a dangerous product into the market.1
53
The current trend is to acknowledge the relevance of foreseeability of
risk to strict liability failure to warn at the stage of determining whether
a duty to warn arose. 54 The Supreme Court of California, one of the
earliest proponents of strict products liability, expressly adhered to this
now widely accepted view inAnderson v. Owens-Corning.5 5 Its reason-
ing is typical of courts adopting this approach and thus will be described
in some detail. The plaintiff brought a strict liability action against
manufacturers of products containing asbestos, arguing, inter alia, that
the defendants had failed to warn of the dangers from exposure to
asbestos or asbestos-containing products. At the first trial, the plaintiff
was not allowed to proceed with this theory and the jury returned a verdict
for the manufacturers on the other ground of recovery argued, finding that
the product had no design defects. The trial judge ordered a new trial in
which the plaintiff could argue strict liability failure to warn and simul-
taneously rejected the manufacturers' attempt to introduce state of the art
evidence to the effect that those at the vanguard of scientific knowledge
at the time the products were supplied, could not have known that
asbestos was dangerous to users in the concentrations associated with the
manufacturers' products. According to the trial judge, knowledge or
knowability of the danger is irrelevant in strict liability failure to warn
situation. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order for a new trial and
confirmed the exclusion of evidence.
In a superseding opinion by Panelli J., the Supreme Court of California
held that "a defendant in a strict products liability action based upon an
alleged failure to warn of a risk of harm may present evidence of the state
of the art, i.e., evidence that the particular risk was neither known nor
knowable by the application of scientific knowledge available at the time
152. See, for example, Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., supra, note 137 at 550 and
Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson, supra, note 132 at 1343-47.
153. Professor Wertheimer, supra, note 4, argues that losses for unknowable dangers should
be borne by manufacturers since, between an innocent injured consumer and the manufacturer
who placed the product in the market, fairness requires that the latter should be held
responsible. She suggests that the "faimess"justification for strict liability has been overshad-
owed by a majority of courts and commentators who concentrate solely on the economic
feasibility of making manufacturers pay forlosses causedby the materialization of unknowable
risks associated with their products.
154. Supra, note 134.
155. Supra, note 34.
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of manufacture and/or distribution."' 56 The Court gave a number of
reasons for rejecting the reasoning of the courts below. The first two are
specific to the Californian context, but the others have been advanced by
most courts taking a similar view. First, California courts recognizing
strict liability failure to warn had, from the beginning, always included a
knowledge or knowability component as an implicit condition of strict
liability.5 7 Second, the "logic and common sense" of Brown v. Superior
Court5 ' "are not limited to drugs". 59 Third, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Commentj, propounds that knowledge or knowability is a compo-
nent of strict liability for failure to warn.16° Fourth, a "majority of other
states" have adopted the view that foreseeability of the risk is a condition
of strict liability for failure to warn and "only a small minority of
jurisdictions" have rejected this view. 61 Fifth, strict products liability is
ajudicial creation which, on more than one occasion, "has incorporated
some well-settled rules from the law of negligence and has survived
judicial challenges asserting that such incorporation violates the funda-
mental principles of the doctrine". 162 Sixth, perhaps to a greater extent
than the manufacturing- or design-defect theories of liability, the warn-
ing-defect theory is by its very nature rooted in negligence.163 Seventh,
strict liability was never intended to make the manufacturer of a product
its insurer, and liability for failing to warn of unforeseeable risks would
have this result.16 Finally, "despite its roots in negligence, failure to warn
156. Ibid. at 559.
157. Ibid. at 554.
158. 44 Cal.3d 1049,751 P.2d 470 (1988), a decision involving prescription drugs where the
Supreme Court of California refused on policy grounds to extend strict liability to failure to
warn of risks that were unknowable at the time of distribution.
159. Anderson v. Owens-Corning, supra, note 34 at 555-56.
160. Ibid. at 553, 556 (n. 12), and 557.
161. Ibid. at 554-56 (nn. 10 and 12).
162. Ibid. at 557-58, observing that assumption of risk and comparative negligence apply to
actions founded on strict products liability, and that a risk/benefit test was adopted with respect
to the determination of design defects: see Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal.3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163
(1972); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162 (1978); and Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co., supra, note 34, respectively.
163. Anderson v. Owens-Corning, ibid. at 558.
164. Ibid. at 559.
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in strict liability differs markedly from failure to warn in the negligence
context". 165
The specific holding ofAnderson v. Owens-Coming is that a manufac-
turer in a strict products liability action based on an alleged failure to warn
can present evidence that the risk was neither known nor knowable by the
application of scientific knowledge available at the time of supply. In this
respect, an argument could be made that the burden is on the manufacturer
to establish the non-foreseeability of the risk, rather than on the plaintiff.
On other occasions, the Supreme Court of California has shifted aspects
of the burden of proof in products liability actions to the manufacturer,
such as the requirement of meeting the risk/benefit test for defective
designs. 66 Some courts who accept the relevance of foreseeability
apparently take this view.167 However, this does not appear to be the view
of the "majority of states" referred to by the Supreme Court in Anderson
v. Owens-Coming,168 nor the view of that court. Although cautiously
stating that knowability of the risk is "relevant ' 16 9 to strict liability for
failure to warn and is a "component' ' 170 of this theory, thereby shedding
no particular light on the burden issue, Panelli J. also characterized this
element as "an implicit condition of strict liability", 71 a "condition of
strict liability",172 a "requisite for strict liability forfailure to warn", 173 and
a "requirement". 174 Such descriptions are more suitable to placing the
burden on the plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer foresaw the risk.
165. Ibid. at 558. The difference perceived by the Supreme Court relates to the breach issue:
in negligence, the question is whether the manufacturer has breached its duty to warn by
somehow falling bellow the relevant standard of care, whereas in strict liability the question
is whether or not the warning provided is adequate in all the circumstances. Mr. Justice Mosk
dissented on this issue, observing that the distinction advanced by the majority, while
"generally accurate", often amounts in practice to a "distinction without a substantial
difference" (ibid. at 562). Citing Professors Henderson and Twerski, supra, note 34, Mosk J.
suggests that: "We should consider the possibility of holding that failure-to-warn actions lie
solely on a negligence theory" (ibid. at 563).
166. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., supra, note 34.
167. The New Jersey Supreme Court took this position in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories,
supra, note 132 at 388 when it relaxed the non rebuttable presumption or imputation of
knowledge earlier announced in Beshada v. Johns-Manville, supra, note 132 by imposing a
requirement of "actual or constructive knowledge" of the danger, but placing the burden on the
defendant "of proving that the information was not reasonably available or obtainable and that
it therefore lacked actual or constructive knowledge of the defect". See also Shanks v. Upjohn
Co., supra, note 134 at 1199-1200.
168. See the annotation noted supra, note 134.
169. Anderson v. Owens-Corning, supra, note 34 at 559.
170. Ibid. at 557.
171. Ibid. at 554.
172. Ibid. at 555, n. 10.
173. Ibid. at 557.
174. Ibid.
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Moreover, in explaining how the two theories of liability "differ mark-
edly" from each other, Panelli J. refrained from placing the burden with
respect to unknowability on the manufacturer, a step taken in Barker v.
Lull Engineering Co. in response to an argument that a risk/benefit
analysis for design defects "rings of negligence".
7 5
Accordingly, the question of whether the defendant manufacturer
owed a duty to warn is essentially answered in the same way under both
recognized theories of liability in the United States: by asking whether the
manufacturer knew or reasonably could have known of the non-obvious
danger associated with its product which materialized and allegedly
caused damages to the plaintiff. This analysis is akin to the one under-
taken by Canadian courts with respect to the same inquiry. A few courts
have imposed the burden of proving unknowability on the manufacturer
in a strict liability context, equating it with any other defence, but the
generally accepted view appears to be that foreseeability is a required
element for the plaintiff to establish. If the answer to this threshold
question is "no", the inquiry ends and the manufacturer is not liable under
either theory. There is no need to consider whether the duty to warn was
breached. If the manufacturer did or could have foreseen the danger,
however, a second inquiry is required. Neither theory of liability has ever
held that the combination of a duty to warn, on the one hand, and damages
caused by the materialization of the risk, on the other hand, is enough to
hold the manufacturer liable. Some intermediary element is required,
namely, a breach of the duty to warn.
With respect to negligent failure to warn, this element is measured by
the manufacturer's failure to act as a reasonable manufacturer would have
in similar circumstances. In other words, the inquiry is focused on the
conduct of the manufacturer and on a comparison of this conduct with the
standard of reasonable care applicable to the particular industry. Section
388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states the requirement as being
a failure "to exercise reasonable care to inform [consumers] of [the
product's] dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous". 76 For example, if everyone in the industry is giving exten-
sive warnings about the dangers associated with the use of a particular
product, and the defendant only gives summary warnings, it may be held
liable for creating an unreasonable risk by its conduct. The fact that the
manufacturer does respect the prevailing standards in the community
does not exempt it from liability, however, as these standards are usually
175. Supra, note 34 at 456. See also Panelli J.'s explanation of the distinction between both
theories in Anderson v. Owens-Corning, supra, note 34 at 558.
176. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388(c) (1965).
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regarded as only evidence of negligence and not conclusive on the
question.1 77 With the extensive use ofjury trials in the United States, it is
somewhat difficult to appreciate the factors which lead a trier of fact to
conclude that a manufacturer was negligent in failing to exercise reason-
able care to inform consumers about the risks associated with the use of
its products.17 1 It is relatively clear, however, that they are asked to
consider the conduct of the manufacturer and not to focus solely on the
question of whether or not the warnings given by the manufacturer are
"adequate" in the circumstances.
1 79
With respect to strict liability failure to warn, this element of breach is
measured by the defectiveness of the product supplied by the manufac-
turer, regardless of the level of care employed. Generally, the question of
whether a product is defective because of a lack of warning and is thereby
"unreasonably dangerous" is determined by considering the adequacy of
the warning provided. The Supreme Court of California in Anderson v.
Owens-Coming stated the issue as follows: "The rules of strict liability
require a plaintiff to prove only that the defendant did not adequately
warn of a particular risk that was known or knowable in light of the
generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowl-
edge available at the time of manufacture and distribution. Thus, in strict
liability, as opposed to negligence, the reasonableness of the defendant's
failure to warn is immaterial."'1 0 The Court gave a somewhat specific
example of what it meant by the distinction: "[A] reasonably prudent
manufacturer might reasonably decide that the risk of harm was such as
not to require a warning as, for example, if the manufacturer's own testing
showed a result contrary to that of others in the scientific community.
177. See, for example, Texas & P.R. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468 at470,23 S.Ct. 622 at 623
(1903)perHolmes J.; The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 at 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932)perHandJ.; and
La Sell v. Tri-States Theatre Corporation, 233 Iowa 929, 11 N.W.2d 36 (1943).
178. It is beyond the scope of this article to engage in a full review of the factors affecting the
,question of breach in the context of negligent failure to warn in the United States. I am
particularly interested in the treatment of this issue under a strict liability theory. On the
question of negligent breach of duty to warn, see generally Dillar & Hart, supra, note 121; H.
Shulman, F. James, and O.S. Gray, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts, 3d ed. (Mineola,
N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1976) at 167-68; and Shapo, supra, note 3, c. 19.
179. Of course, the adequacy of the warning in all the circumstances is a relevant inquiry even
under a negligence theory as the product must contain some defect. The theory of negligence,
however, requires some connection between the inadequate nature of the warning and the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in attempting to inform consumers.
180. Supra, note 34 at 558-59. See also the cases noted supra, note 139 recognizing the
relevance of the manufacturer's foreseeability of the risk during the duty inquiry, but then
differentiating between both standards of liability during the breach inquiry, especially Shanks
v. The Upjohn Company, Ellis v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Company, and Fibreboard Corpo-
ration v. Fenton.
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Such a manufacturer might escape liability under negligence principles.
In contrast, under strict liability principles the manufacturer has no such
leeway; the manufacturer is liable if it failed to give warning of dangers
that were known to the scientific community at the time it manufactured
or distributed the product. Whatever may be reasonable from the point of
view of the manufacturer, the user of the product must be given the option
either to refrain from using the product at all or to use it in such a way as
to minimize the degree of danger." 8 ' What constitutes an "adequate"
warning is beyond the scope of this article. Someone once noted that
"there are almost as many interpretations of the specific elements
constituting an adequate warning as there are warning cases".1 12 The
important point is that, under strict liability, the focus is entirely on the
warning attached to the product and the sole question is whether it
conveys sufficient information to consumers about the known or know-
able dangers associated with the product as to promote the dual objectives
of warnings: reducing unnecessary risks and allowing consumer in-
formed-choices about products. If it does, the product is not defective and
the manufacturer is not liable. If it does not, the manufacturer is liable for
having supplied a defective product,183 regardless of whether or not a
standard of reasonable care would otherwise have exonerated the manu-
facturer.
III. An Emerging Compound Standard of Liability for Failure to Warn
This review suggests the emergence of a new standard, combining
elements of both negligence and strict liability with respect to failure to
warn. Regardless of the theory adopted, foreseeability of the risk is a
crucial factor in determining whether a duty to warn is owed in a
particular setting. As conceded by courts of a strict liability tradition in
the United States, the incorporation of this element into the analysis adds
a flavour of negligence to the inquiry of whether manufacturers should be
held responsible for damages allegedly caused by their products. Indeed,
a defendant's foreseeability plays a crucial role in the law of negligence;
it is central to the determination of whether the defendant owed a duty of
181. Ibid. at 559.
182. B. Wrubel, "Liability for Failure to Warn or Instruct" in Product Liability: Warnings,
Instructions, andRecalls 1984 (New York: Practising Law Institute, 1984) 9 at 38. The author
offers a fairly extensive review of the question at 38-45. See also Shapo, supra, note 3, c. 19
at 62-66.
183. As noted, an added inquiry might be whether this defect makes the product "unreason-
ably dangerous" within the meaning of § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for those
states adopting this modifier.
352 The Dalhousie Law Journal
care vis-a-vis the particular plaintiff. In this respect, it is easy to under-
stand why this element plays a central role in the Canadian context when
the duty to warn issue is considered.
However, an analysis of the manufacturer's liability does not end after
this preliminary inquiry. In both countries, foreseeability of risk com-
bined with damages caused by the materialization of said risk are
insufficient in themselves to give rise to liability. There must be a breach
of the duty to warn and it is during this second inquiry that changes in the
focus occur. While the analysis in both countries starts off sounding like
negligence, it adopts a strong flavour of strict liability when considering
whether or not the duty to warn has been breached. Courts focus almost
exclusively on the nature of the product, asking themselves whether the
warning was adequate in all the circumstances. In this inquiry, the
reasonable care exercised by the manufacturer is often treated as imma-
terial, even though it forms the very heart of a cause of action for
negligence. Courts in the United States adhering to strict liability often
use the distinction in focus (the product and not the conduct) during this
second stage in order to emphasize that they are still committed to liability
without fault. Courts in Canada, however, do not have a similar excuse.
Thus, it is apparent that courts in both countries depart from their
respective theories of liability at different stages of the analysis. Many
courts in the United States depart from pure strict liability during the
preliminary inquiry into the existence of a duty to warn, relying heavily,
like their Canadian counterparts, on the notion of foreseeability of the
risk. Many courts in Canada depart from pure negligence liability during
the breach inquiry by adopting an approach similar to the one adopted by
their counterparts in the United States. In the end, a common approach
emerges combining elements taken from both standards of liability.
Commentators in the United States, noting the growing relevance
played by foreseeability in strict liability failure to warn, have generally
reacted in one of three ways. Some have criticized this as an impermis-
sible infusion of negligence and have called for a return to pure strict
liability.'m At the other extreme, some have suggested that this result is
inevitable and appropriate since defects in warnings are fundamentally
different from manufacturing defects and must intrinsically be judged
according to negligence factors. 185 In the middle, some have acknowl-
184. See, for example, Wetheimer, supra, note 4; Note, "Is There a Distinction Between Strict
Liability and Negligence in Failure to Warn Actions" (1981), 15 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 983; and
Martineau, "The Duty to Warn Under Strict Products Liability as Limited by the Knowledge
Requirement: A Regretful Retention of Negligence Concepts" (1981), 26 St. Louis U.L.J. 125.
185. See, for example, Henderson & Twerski, supra, note 34 and Bromberg, supra, note 142.
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edged that foreseeability is relevant but have called for the introduction
of other features in order to underscore the distinction between both
theories.1 6 What these commentators have in common is their tendency
to presumptively equate a consideration of foreseeability at the prelimi-
nary stage of the existence of a duty with a standard of fault liability.5 7
They assume it is not possible for foreseeability and strict liability to
coexist, and that courts should therefore (1) reject the infusion of
forseeability in order to uphold strict liability, (2) openly recognize that
they are in essence applying a pure negligence theory and that it is the
correct standard for failure to warn, or (3) keep foreseeability while
developing new distinguishing features for strict liability failure to
warn.1
88
My reaction to the current situation in Canada and the United States is
different. For my part, I believe forseeability of risk (during the duty
inquiry) and strict liability (during the breach inquiry) can indeed coexist,
that such a peaceful coexistence is not surprising considering the current
legal framework, and that the emerging combined standard of liability
should be openly acknowledged and adopted since it represents a just
compromise between the competing interests of consumers and
manufacturers.
The assumption that foreseeability of risk cannot coexist with strict
liability ought to be rejected. When a court finds that a manufacturer did
not know, or could not have reasonably known, about a risk at the time
186. See, for example, Note, "Reformulating the Strict Liability Failure to Warn", supra,
note 4.
187. The tendency in U.S. scholarship to equate forseeability during the duty inquiry with a
standard of negligence governing the breach inquiry has some basis. If a risk is foreseeable and
the manufacturer provides no warning whatsoever, the distinction between negligence and
strict liability at the stage of the breach inquiry is indeed non-existent. In essence, under either
theory a court can be taken as saying that the manufacturer did not act in a reasonably prudent
manner in not warning of a known or knowable risk. A reasonable manufacturer placed in its
shoes would have behaved differently and would have offered some warning. When some
warning is provided, however, this basis disappears. Indeed, I submit that an important
distinction between both theories does (or rather, should) emerge when a warning is provided.
Under a pure negligence theory, courts ought to evaluate the efforts made by the manufacturer
to warn consumers of foreseeable risks. They ought to weigh the costs of avoiding the danger
along with the likelihood of its occurrence and the gravity of the danger. They ought to consider
what a reasonable manufacturer would have done in the circumstances. Their focus would be
on the conduct of the manufacturer and the care exercised in making consumers aware of
foreseeable risks. Yet, many courts in both Canada and the United States focus exclusively on
the nature of the product and conduct a technical analysis into whether or not the warning
provided is "adequate". In making this determination, the care exercised by the manufacturer
is not the determining factor.
188. Only a few commentators appear to accept the recent judgments in this respect at their
face value; that is, as standing for a watered-down standard of strict liability in the context of
failure to warn. See Pearson, supra, note 4 and Note, "The Move Toward a Negligence
Standard in Strict Products Liability Failure to Warn Cases", supra, note 4.
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of supply, it is not saying anything about the manufacturer's negligence
in the circumstances. At the stage of determining the existence of a duty
to warn, the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct is not the issue.
Rather, courts are deciding, for reasons not dissimilar to those motivating
the rule derived from Winterbottom v. Wright,89 that the manufacturer
did not owe a duty to avoid this particular occurrence. This old rule was
not based on a presumed reasonableness of manufacturers' conduct, but
on concerns with slippery slopes, floodgates of litigation, and unlimited
defendant liability. The difference with the old rule of privity, however,
is that courts have substituted a flexible principle taking into account each
particular case for the old absolute prohibition against non-privy suits in
tort. This newer rule, holding a manufacturer liable only if the risk in
question could have been foreseen, is also based on sound principle and
policy with respect to the fairness and social utility of turning manufac-
turers into virtual insurers for the products they supply. It is impossible
for a manufacturer to predict unknowable risks and to insure itself
accordingly. Many have noted the infeasibility of spreading losses which
arise from unknowable risks and hazards among all users of the prod-
uct. 1 0 Making a manufacturer liable for failing to warn of unknowable
risks could lead to an increase in superfluous warnings, to consumer
apathy, and to a decrease in innovation by fear of unlimited liability.
Thus, while I suggest that the current approach is akin to the rule derived
from Winterbottom v. Wright in that neither says anything about the
reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct, I am not suggesting that
both rules have similar foundations. Like the old privity rule, the principle
that a duty to warn is owed only with respect to foreseeable risks performs
a gate-keeping function. It lets in only those actions which are considered
worthy of judicial attention on broad policy grounds having little, if
anything, to do with negligence.
In Canada, a combined standard conforms with a growing trend
towards imposing stricter liability on manufacturers within the current
framework of the law negligence. It is surely not unusual for Canadian
courts to focus on foreseeability of risk at the preliminary stage of
determining the existence of a duty to warn. But, the switch afterwards to
strict liability in cases where they must evaluate the adequacy of a
warning should not be surprising either. Canadian courts have slowly
been moving in the direction of imposing greater responsibilities on
189. Supra, note 31.
190. See, for example, J.A. Henderson, "Coping with Time Dimension in Products Liability"
(1981), 69 Cal. L. Rev. 919 at 948-49 and Wade, "On the Effect in Product Liability of
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing" (1983), 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 734.
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manufacturers for defective products, irrespective of fault. This is par-
ticularly noticeable in the area of manufacturing defects via the use of
evidential devices such as res ipsa loquitur.'91 While reluctant to openly
adopt strict tort liability, Canadian courts have shown a tendency to infuse
elements of this theory within the current analytical framework. Perhaps
motivated by recent criticism addressed to strict products liability in the
United States, 192 Canadian courts have so far refused to take drastic steps
in modifying the manner in which losses caused by defective products are
shifted to manufacturers. A theoretical showing of negligence is still
required. However, in a quintessentially Canadian fashion, they have
adopted a defacto compromise between both traditions with respect to
failure to warn: on the one hand, the manufacturer is not held responsible
for failing to warn of risks which are neither known nor knowable at the
time of supply (the duty to warn issue); on the other hand, the reasonable
care exercised by the manufacturer in attempting to warn consumers is
not determinative with respect to liability (the breach issue). The first
aspect allows them to adhere to a theory of negligence and avoid virtually
unlimited manufacturer liability, while the second alleviates the plaintiff s
burden of proof and promotes the social policies which gave rise to strict
tort liability in the United States.
The mixed standard of liability protects manufacturers from unlimited
liability and from becoming insurers for their products. As noted by many
courts in the United States, it was never the goal of strict liability to turn
manufacturers into insurers for their products. 193 Making them liable for
unforeseeable risks would have such an effect as it would not be possible
for them to adopt measures to avoid such risks, nor would it be possible
for them to adequately insure themselves. It is possible to deter conduct
creating foreseeable risks, whether such conduct is labelled negligent or
not. Strict liability can indeed deter some accidents by forcing manufac-
turers to adopt preventive measures which perhaps would not otherwise
be required by a standard of reasonable care. But, short of forcing social
actors into complete inaction, it is not possible to deter the creation of
unforeseeable risks. At the heart of deterrence is some notion of
191. For a recent example, see Farro v. Nutone Electrical Ltd., supra, note 13.
192. See, forexample, the recent articles listed supra, note 17 as well as P.W. Huber, Liability:
The LegalRevolution and its Consequences (New York: Basic Books, 1988); R.J. Stayin, "The
U.S. Product Liability System: A Competitive Advantage to Foreign Manufacturers" (1988),
14 Can.-U.S. L.J. 193; G.S. Frazza, "A U.S. View of the Products Liability Aspects of
Innovation" (1989) 15 Can.-U.S. L.J. 85; and A. Schwartz, "Proposals for Product Liability
Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis" (1988), 97 Yale L.J. 353.
193. See, for example, Anderson v. Owens-Coming, supra, note 34 at 559 and Fibreboard
Corporation v. Fenton, supra, note 134 at 1175.
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foreseeability of the risk which should be avoided. A rule requiring
manufacturers to warn against risks which were neither known nor
knowable at the time of supply would do nothing to achieve an optimal
level of deterrence, and could ultimately have negative impacts on the
innovation of new products and on the rationales for failure fo warn law.
Conceivably, manufacturers would swamp consumers with multiple
standard-form warnings to protect themselves against potential liability,
leading to increased consumer confusion and indifference. The rationales
of preventing accidents and permitting informed choices would ulti-
mately be impaired if manufacturers were forced to warn of every
possible risk associated with their products, whether reasonably foresee-
able or not.
For these reasons, I believe the emerging standard of liability is worth
encouraging. Courts in Canada and the United States should be more
open about the manner in which they are making decisions with respect
to failure to warn. Instead of strongly adhering to one theory of liability
or the other, believing that there is no compromise position to be taken,
they should openly acknowledge that they are in fact using a compound
approach superior to either taken in isolation. To be sure, I am not
criticizing the judiciary of either country for making bonafide efforts to
preserve the internal consistency of their respective traditions with
respect to products liability. But when it becomes apparent that some-
thing else is going on, courts should either reject the interpretation
advanced herein and return to a strict application of negligence or strict
liability, or they should openly recognize that they are applying a mixed
standard of liability. Such candour would diminish much of the confusion
currently existing in this area, thereby increasing the predictability of the
law and economising valuable judicial resources.
Conclusion
Currently, there is a gap in Canada and the United States between the
standard of liability adopted in theory to decide failure to warn actions
involving products and the standard used in practice. Regardless of the
language chosen, courts in both countries often use a common approach
which combines elements of negligence and strict liability. Under this
approach, the manufacturer's foreseeability of the risk is initially focused
on in order to determine whether a duty to warn arose. If such a duty is
triggered, the focus switches to the defective nature of the product and to
an inquiry into whether the warning on the product was adequate. When
no warning whatsoever is given, the inquiry does not proceed any further
and the manufacturer is held liable provided the other requirements of the
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tort are met. In such a scenario, there is no practical difference between
a theory of strict liability and one of negligence, unless perhaps one shifts
the burden with respect to foreseeability to the manufacturer under the
former. If some warning is provided, however, an important distinction
emerges at the stage of the breach inquiry. In theory, a negligence
standard would require an evaluation of the manufacturer's efforts in
warning consumers, taking into consideration factors such as the costs of
avoiding the accident, the likelihood of its occurrence, and the severity of
the harm done. However, in both countries, the unreasonableness of the
manufacturer's conduct is not given a determining role during this second
inquiry. Courts focus chiefly on the defective nature of the product and
conduct a technical analysis related to the adequacy of the warnings
provided. In the end, a manufacturer can be held liable if its product is
defective, in the sense of not carrying adequate warnings, even though it
exercised reasonable care in attempting to warn consumers of the dangers
associated with its products.
Accordingly, it is misleading to describe the situation in either country
solely in terms of negligence or strict liability. With respect to many states
in the United States, a "strict liability" label does not give adequate
consideration to the fact that foreseeability of risk is used as a threshold
requirement for the existence of a duty to warn. With respect to the
common law provinces of Canada, a "negligence" label underscores the
importance given to the manufacturer's knowledge-actual or construc-
tive-of the danger, yet does not fully reflect the manner in which a
growing number of courts are conducting the breach inquiry. Moreover,
simply changing one label for the other would not resolve the confusion,
as the opposite arguments could then be made. That is, references to either
of these standards in isolation does not fill the current gap between theory
and practice. Experience in both countries reveals the emergence of a
compound standard of liability with respect to warning defects, which
cannot be understood solely in terms of negligence or strict liability.
There is nothing inherently illogical with such a combinatory standard
of liability. In the United States, it conforms to the letter and spirit of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which makes foreseeability relevant with
respect to the existence of a duty to warn, while at the same time
disregarding the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct as the
focus of any breach inquiry. In Canada, it conforms with a growing trend
towards imposing stricter liability on manufacturers within the current
framework of the law negligence. Furthermore, such a standard promotes
the traditional goals of strict tort liability while protecting manufacturers
from unlimited liability and preventing them from becoming insurers for
their products. In essence, it represents a compromise between both
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traditions: in the context of the duty to warn inquiry, the manufacturer is
not held responsible for failing to warn of risks which are neither known
nor knowable at the time of supply while, in the context of the breach
inquiry, the reasonable care exercised in attempting to warn consumers
is not given determining weight. The problem, however, is the fidelity of
courts in both countries to their respective theories of liability. Instead of
strongly adhering to one traditional standard, an approach bound to create
confusion and waste valuable judicial. resources, they should openly
acknowledge the use of a mixed approach.
The debate with respect to Canadian products liability can learn from
the foregoing. The case for reforming this area and for adopting a standard
of strict tort liability must be-more discriminating than it currently is. I
believe the current debate overly generalizes the necessity and practical-
ity of adhering to a theory of strict liability, and fails to take into account
the practical experience with this standard in the United States. Concen-
trating on manufacturing defects and the use of devices such as res ipsa
loquitur to lighten the plaintiffs burden, and deducing that the open
adoption of all-encompassing strict products liability would be an incre-
mental step of great benefit does not tell the entire story. As evidenced by
the experience in the United States, such a standard, while relatively easy
to apply when manufacturing defects are involved, is not always suitable
for defects in designs and warnings. Courts south of the Canadian border
have been struggling ever since Greenman194 and its progeny to establish
tests and criteria faithful to liability without fault for dealing with these
areas.
Undoubtedly, Canadian courts and legislatures would encounter simi-
lar problems if they adopt a general standard of strict tort liability. They
have the hindsight and flexibility required to avoid reforms that would do
little to actually improve the situation of a plaintiff injured by a product,
but would create confusion for consumers, litigants, juries, judges, and
commentators. They should deal with these problems before they arise by
tailoring reforms to specific types of defects. For the reasons motivating
a move to strict liability in the United States, 195 the open recognition of
strict tort liability for manufacturing defects should be encouraged in the
Canadian context. In my view, such a reform could be accomplished
judicially as it represents an incremental change to the status quo and falls
within the guidelines established by the Supreme Court of Canada for
194. Supra, note 46.
195. Supra, notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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court-made reforms to the Common Law.196 With respect to design and
especially warning defects, however, any reform should seriously con-
sider whether this standard would actually alter the way cases are
currently being decided.
On this point, the debate should also pay closer attention to the way
courts of both countries are actually applying their theories of liability. In
actions for failure to warn, Canadian courts have already adopted ele-
ments of strict liability in their analysis. The necessity of changing
standards in such a context is therefore diminished. In addition, many
courts in the United States that have made such a move in theory are in
fact using an approach almost identical to the one currently used in
Canada. In my opinion, a standard of strict liability in this context would
impose an unnecessary detour in the current path of Canadian courts.
Initially, they would struggle with the distinction between negligence and
strict liability as applied to failure to warn. Eventually, however, they
would return to their current position; that is, applying a standard which
combines elements of both negligence and strict liability. Again, itwould
be better for courts to openly acknowledge the compromise approach
they have adopted. In the meantime, those seeking reform in Canada
should not conclude from the judiciary's silence that a move from a
theory of negligence to one of strict liability would actually give rise to
a meaningfully different approach in deciding who should bear the losses
caused by products with defective warnings.
196. See the recent trilogy of Watkins v. Olafson, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 750,61 D.L.R. (4th) 577;
Salituro v. The Queen, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 654,131 N.R. 161; and London Drugs Ltd. v. Brassart
and Vanwinkel, supra, note 29.
